This is a Summary Report of a Peer Review that was initially developed in March 2017, by convening 5 organisations delivering protection and mixed migration-related assistance: Cooperazione e Sviluppo Onlus (CESVI), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The purpose of the Peer Review was (1) to measure current programming of the protection and mixed migration sector against the three conflict sensitivity principles agreed for Libya (inclusivity, accountability, perceptions of the state), and (2) to identify strengths and weaknesses of the sector to act in a conflict-sensitive manner. The Peer Review was facilitated by the Peaceful Change initiative (PCI) as part of ongoing support for conflict-sensitive assistance to Libya. The full Peer Review report is to be found on PCI’s website.
Main findings and recommendations

In March 2017, Peaceful Change initiative (PCI) convened a conflict-sensitivity voluntary peer review with five organisations as well as a consortium working in the sector of protection and mixed migration. Across the three agreed Principles for Conflict-Sensitive Assistance (CSA), the key findings and recommendations from the review are:

**Principle 1: ‘Assistance should be as inclusive as possible’**

(1) Interventions are concentrated in the northwest

Participating organisations focus much of their protection programming in Western Libya where access is easier and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) offers a more conducive operating environment. Only one organisation consistently works in other parts of Libya, with others either withdrawing or temporarily suspending operations due to security concerns. The DTM and other monitoring clearly shows the South and East of the country also have significant numbers of vulnerable mixed migrants and IDPs whose protection needs are critical and largely unmet. Further, some areas with highest frequency of incidents of tension between migrants and local communities are in the South and East, specifically in Ubari, Ghat and Wadi Ashshati, yet only two of the review participants are working in these areas.

This geographical gap means some nationalities that are located largely in the East, such as Egyptians and Sudanese, are marginalised from the international response.

Recommendations:

1.1. Hold a robust and honest discussion across the sector, acknowledging current geographic gaps in programming where protection needs are not being met, and develop a sector level strategy for addressing these gaps as a matter of some urgency.

1.2. Establish a sub-working group to explore the feasibility of programming in the more challenging areas, including discussions on the necessary negotiations, risk assessments, management and contingency plans.

1.3. Hold discussions with donors to secure the necessary funds for mappings and conflict analysis necessary for opening new programming areas.

(2) The challenge of supporting the ‘invisible’ mixed migrant community

It is commonly acknowledged among participants that some in the mixed migration community choose to remain ‘invisible’ for a variety of reasons, including to avoid arrest and detention, exploitation by groups of smugglers and people traffickers, armed violence, among others. This group of mixed migrants are some of the most vulnerable; their needs, the discrimination they face and general circumstances are not fully understood.

Recommendations:

2.1. Establish a sector wide strategy and methodology to ensure that the needs of the ‘invisible’ and ‘beyond reach’ target group are included in analysis and needs assessments.

2.2. Hire and train data gatherers from local communities.

2.3. Ensure a “needs assessment(s)” budget line is included in all project M&E plans, with time allocated in work plans, and an indicator for donor reporting.

(3) ‘Conflict-sensitising’ needs assessments

In addition to the fact that many migrants choose to remain ‘invisible’ as in (2) above, there is acknowledgement within the sector that those identified by trackers and needs assessments do not wholly represent the diversity of those in need of protection interventions. The current approach to decision-making on programming locations and needs assessments mean that many beneficiaries are overlooked. This is in part due to some departments and local government authorities themselves having a bias toward certain tribes and ethnicities, such as the Awlad Suleiman dominance over the Municipal Council in Sabha. Equally these offices are largely divided in reporting to, and being funded by, either the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) in
Tripoli or the MoLG under the eastern Thinni Government respectively. This can result in challenges in accessing and identifying mixed migrant beneficiaries.

Contributing factors to this include: access to some locations is limited; some individuals or communities of mixed migrants prefer to remain invisible; the existence of discrimination and xenophobia on the part of local partners or staff and by some local communities. The degree to which this impacts the integrity of information and analysis that informs programming, and so leads to inequity and marginalisation, is little understood.

**Recommendations:**

3.1. Develop sector-wide guidelines on how to identify and train data collectors from migrant communities, or those with good relations to these communities (as 2.2 above).

3.2. Include a budget line for communication on implementation approaches with the target group.

**Principle 2: ‘Assistance should strengthen the ability of our partners to be equally accountable across communities and constituencies’**

(4) **Building and sustaining political relationships**

With political bridges in Libya noticeable only by their absence, and international donors favouring the GNA, building relationships across geographies and political divides presents a distinct challenge. The cooperation of municipal authorities and higher level government counterparts is determined by political allegiances. With local councils being the only functioning institutions in some areas, municipal leaders are often solely responsible for oversight of meeting needs of mixed migrants. The result is that decision-makers and service providers who do not want to work with ‘international’ organisations are beyond reach of the best efforts of the protection and migration sector.

**Recommendations:**

4.1. Standardise messaging across the sector to ensure that central and local authorities are kept well-informed by all international implementers and their national partners of project activities and ultimate aims of protection strategies and actions.

(5) **Commitment and integrity of government departments and other local stakeholders**

With uncertainty around the integrity of governance structures, the sector relies on cooperative Ministries, but crucially on local level relationships facilitating their work. Even with approval at the Ministry level, local level challenges can occur; for example, access to detention centres are reportedly negotiated separately with the manager of each centre – often with great difficulty.

Corruption and opportunism is rife in Libya: each new relationship building cycle (see (4) above) leaves organisations exposed to a high risk of exploitation by opportunistic or biased staff, and more importantly, compromises the support provided to some of Libya’s most vulnerable.

**Recommendations:**

5.1. Given government staff turnover, rather than rely on a single contact point within national and local authorities, cultivate relationships at different levels to strengthen resilience of the partnership and to provide coordination options less vulnerable to a single-point-of-failure scenario.

5.2. Develop a partnership strategy that prioritises the building of trust and confidence, mutual respect, role recognition and the sharing of knowledge and resources.

(6) **Limited pool of potential local CSO partners**

Local CSOs typically have limited capacity and varying levels of commitment and longevity.

Prejudice against particular groups of migrants, limited capacity and understanding of some issues, such as SGBV and psychosocial programming, are some of the challenges international organisations face in identifying and building the capacity of local partners. The perceptions and prejudices of these local partners inform project decisions; meanwhile, remote programming modalities present challenges to quality capacity development, mentoring and coaching.
Independent verification of the results of capacity development is difficult – in some cases, impossible.

**Recommendations:**

6.1. Commit to mapping local CSOs in new intervention areas; if possible utilising an inter-agency approach to improve reach, triangulate information and analysis of the social make up, capacity, views and ethics of potential local partners to address issues of bias.

6.2. Where possible, share capacity development resources for local partners.

6.3. Establish and integrate robust monitoring frameworks that consider the potential challenges of low capacity, lack of inclusiveness and bias both within the organisation and toward the target beneficiary community (methodologies might include participatory, peer and third party monitoring).

(7) Remote programming modality presents challenges to accountability frameworks

Although some organisations do have their own teams on the ground, the fact that management teams are largely based in Tunis present challenges to accountability frameworks. It also leaves programming vulnerable to the reality of authorities often favouring some groups of mixed migrants over others; a challenge common across several sectors of international assistance in Libya - as highlighted in 3 and 6 above.

Accountability mechanisms must bypass these actors so not to reinforce perceptions of bias in aid delivery.

**Recommendations:**

7.1. Increase on-the-ground presence and ensure robust M&E (as in 6.3 above) for local partners, with similar models at each level of the intervention.

Principle 3: ‘Assistance should strengthen the connection between state institutions and communities across the country, by delivering tangible improvements.

(8) Confidence and trust in government

Disruption or closure of public administration and service provision has weakened the connection between state institutions, and between these institutions and communities.

The perception of well-funded international programmes providing or shoring up administrative processes such as registration and referrals of migrants, voluntary returns and also essential service provision has only served to exacerbate the low confidence and trust many local communities feel toward their local governments.

When government does provide expertise, for example for meetings and workshops, often in partnership with international organisations, they commonly receive very little visibility, reinforcing the dominant role of the international partner among communities. Moreover, there is a risk that communities quietly question the motives of government staff travelling to Tunis for training by international organisations; especially if there is little perceived benefit in administrative process or service delivery.

**Recommendations:**

8.1. Where appropriate, ensure projects are in line with, and reference, Libyan laws and policies.

8.2. Facilitate greater local government ownership of interventions and encourage visibility at municipality, agency and department level.

8.3. Include the concept and practice of feedback loops in all relevant training workshops, and make it a pre-condition of attending subsequent Tunis-based training and meetings.