The Conflict Sensitive Assistance in Libya (CSA) forum, convened by the Embassy of Switzerland to Libya and the European Union and facilitated by the Peaceful Change Initiative (PCI), met for its 35th meeting (CSA 35) on 30 April 2020. The meeting was held online.

The objectives of the meeting were to:

1. Update the joint conflict analysis of the CSA process and apply the analysis to specific areas of practice;
2. Present and review potential scenarios relating to the situation in Libya and their impact on international assistance.

Summary update of national peace and conflict analysis

The update period saw continued worsening in the peace and conflict context in Libya, further complicated by uncertainty resulting from the emergence of the global COVID-19 pandemic.

Political

The update period saw little progress on international mediation efforts, increased polarisation between national actors and moves to shift political authority in the East.

Efforts to build on the Berlin process (see last update) have made limited progress. Three series of talks, focussing on military, political and economic affairs respectively, have been initiated under the auspices of the Berlin process; however, neither of the two major factions demonstrated willingness to engage in the process in good faith. Both factions have at several points suspended their participation in the talks, citing dissatisfaction with elements of the process or requiring unrealistic demands to be met as a precondition for their participation. Within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, UNSMIL has stated that the Berlin process is continuing, albeit with a decreased pace and alternative methods. Nevertheless, concerns remain that international political and diplomatic attention on Libya is reduced as a result of the pandemic.

On 2 March, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Salame resigned citing health reasons. On 11 March Deputy SRSG for Political Affairs, Stephanie Williams, was appointed acting SRSG until a new SRSG is appointed.

February and March also saw the African Union moving to take an increased role in resolving the conflict in Libya, designating Libya a conflict of focus for the Union and announcing that reconciliation talks will be hosted in Ethiopia in July.
On 23 April House of Representatives Speaker (in the East) Ageelah Saleh made a statement declaring that the Libyan Political Agreement had failed and called for a new political process, including a three-member presidency council leading to elections. On the same day, Khalifa Haftar announced the establishment of military rule across Libya, calling for Libyans to support him. Some demonstrations in support of Haftar occurred in towns, particularly in the East. However, statements by groups, both in the West and in the East, demonstrated that support for Haftar’s move is not universal. International actors issued statements in reaction confirming their endorsement of the LPA and commitment to a dialogue-based political path.

Security and Justice

the update period saw a significant intensification in fighting, shifts in control of some areas and changes to combat capacity as a result of international support to GNA and LNA forces.

On 17 March, a number of embassies and states along with the EU delegation called for an immediate, humanitarian cessation of hostilities as well as a halt to the continuing transfer of all military equipment and personnel into Libya in order to allow local authorities to respond to the public health challenge posed by COVID-19. While both the LNA and the GNA declared their commitment to a ceasefire, they accused the other side of breaching it and fighting has continued unabated.

The escalation in foreign military support identified in the last update period continued. On 21 February, Turkish president Erdogan confirmed the presence of Turkish-linked Syrian opposition forces in Libya, fighting with the GNA. Consistent reports have also emerged of Syrian irregular forces being deployed to fight for the LNA as well.

The increase in Turkish military support since the beginning of the year has increased the military capacity of GNA, which, over the update period, began to pursue a more aggressive strategy to fend of the offensive on Tripoli and target strategic LNA positions. On 25 March, Operation Peace Storm was launched and GNA forces have pushed LNA forces out of several cities along the western coastal area, including Sabratha and Sorman, and launched ongoing offensives on Al Watiya airbase and Tarhuna.

Nevertheless, lines of control in other areas, including Tripoli, remained essentially the same. Indiscriminate heavy bombardment has repeatedly targeted residential areas in Tripoli and Tarhuna, including medical facilities. Following bombardment from 7 to 9 April, activity was momentarily halted at Al-Kadhra hospital in Tripoli which holds facilities for treating and isolating COVID-19 patients. Flights at Mitiga airport has been halted several times due to shelling.

On 17 February, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to a new naval mission to monitor arms transfers and enforce the arms embargo on Libya, replacing Operation Sophia. The mission, Operation Irini, officially began on 1 April. As it will target maritime shipments, some analysis has suggested that, if effective, it will be likely to disproportionately affect GNA forces which receive the majority of foreign military support by sea, compared to the LNA which is said to receive shipment by air and land.

Economic

the update period saw unlawful disruptions to water and energy supplies, a continuously increasing economic cost of the oil blockade and humanitarian preparations for COVID-19.

The blockade of Libyan oil production by the LNA continued during the update period. Despite the ongoing oil blockade, National Oil Company Chief Mustafa Sanallah rejected claims of shortages of fuel supplies in some areas in the East, assuring that fuel was being distributed to the whole country (although he noted that the NOC faces challenges transporting fuel to the South due to the deteriorating security situation).
On 9 April, a pipeline which is part of the Great Man-Made River was disrupted by a group in the Shwerif area, under the control of the LNA, reportedly to push for the release of family members. This resulted in shortage in water supplies to the greater Tripoli area and coastal areas and coincided with extensive power cuts suffered in the capital. An agreement to restore water was reached on 13 April.

The rival governmental authorities have adopted differing responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, including in terms of security responses.

The different responses at the national level have also complicated national and municipal level relations. Allocation of funds to municipalities across the country by the GNA received mixed responses by municipal authorities: categorically rejected by municipalities affiliated with or under the control of the LNA, the funds were welcomed by some GNA-aligned municipalities, while several municipalities refused to accept the allocations due to dissatisfaction with the amount and with the lack of consultation in the allocation process. With the exception of Benghazi, municipalities under the control of the Interim Government and the LNA have reportedly received little support to prepare for an outbreak. In response to lacking support from national authorities, municipalities across the country have imposed their own local regulations and taken autonomous steps to prepare for an outbreak, such as establishing local COVID-19 crisis committees.

**Social**

The update period saw ongoing polarisation, rising fears relating to the COVID-19 virus, including instances of xenophobia. However, it also saw the emergence of social movements seeking to contribute to addressing COVID-19 together.

A clear demonstration of the social cost of polarisation at the local level emerged as the GNA recaptured areas on the North West coast in March and April. Sabratha, for example, has seen tensions between those who support the GNA and those who had been seen to side with the LNA, including reprisal attacks against the latter.

A shortage of accurate information and the dissemination of misinformation about COVID-19 has been an emerging issue. There have been instances of xenophobia as foreign workers have been perceived as carriers of the COVID-19 virus. Some communities have shown resistance to establishing treatment and isolation facilities for COVID-19 patients in their areas, and sometimes taken it upon themselves to shut down local medical facilities. Others have ceased to function due to absence of staff citing lack of protocol to protect against transmission. Ill equipped medical workers have in some instances refused to treat patients showing COVID-19 like symptoms.

Community movements have also risen to contribute to preventing and addressing the outbreak, including local mask productions and civil society calls for are effective action by authorities. On 29 March, a group of 200 Libyan intellectuals and public figures signed a letter calling for unity between the country’s warring sides to fight the outbreak.

Domestic violence incidents have risen, possibly related to the lockdown adversely affecting women and children, with several domestic murder being reported during the update period.

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The complete CSA national peace and conflict analysis, as well as a more detailed overview of the updates for this period including updates to individual peace and conflict factors, can be found by logging into the OPSECA online platform at: https://opseca.humanidev.tech/opseca/?p=dashboard&a=6.

To register a profile and use of the platform, please contact kristine.raunkiaer@peacefulchange.org. Only organisations participating in the forum have access to the online platform (one login profile per organisation).
Conflict sensitivity considerations related to projected scenarios for peace and conflict in Libya

Following the presentation of the summary update covering the changes to the context since the last CSA forum, PCI presented different scenarios outlining different potential future trajectories the conflict in Libya may take over the next 12 months. The scenarios are constructed around an analysis of possible developments in key variable peace and conflict factors. For this scenario update, the following variable factors were seen to be particularly important in shaping the context over the next 12 months:

- National political division (including recent attempts to shift political authority in the East);
- Internationally-led political processes;
- International military involvement;
- Military situation on the ground;
- Competition over national economic resources;
- National-local relations;
- Humanitarian situation and access to basic services;
- Inter- and intra-communal tensions;
- Political space and control; and
- COVID-19 pandemic.

Different ways in which these variables shift were analysed and combined to create the scenario projections.

Working in groups on each of the scenarios, participants reviewed the scenarios, assessing whether they present plausible developments given the current context and recent trends. The groups also discussed which implications the given scenarios may have for delivering assistance, and identified conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities arising out of each scenario, including who should take actions to leverage the identified opportunities. The scenarios and summaries of discussions are outlined below.

**Scenario 1: Political actors remain constant, reinvigorated political process**

*Description of Scenario*

This scenario projects a situation where national actors, driven by domestic and foreign pressures, make tangible progress towards identifying a political solution.

Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to consolidate control over the East is inconclusive. Haftar’s military influence is not particularly affected and he remains an important actor in the East, in effect keeping the situation as before.

As a result of sustained and coordinated diplomatic efforts, international diplomatic efforts become more united. Permanent members of the security council agree on the appointment of a new, effective SRSG quickly who reinvigorates the political dialogue based on the Berlin process. Within this context, influential international actors agree that a political solution is the only way forward and develop a common approach, including either reducing military support themselves or pressuring other international actors to do so.

At the beginning of the scenario period, both the GNA and LNA initially continue to pursue a military solution in Tripoli, leading to an initial increase in violence. Ultimately, not significant change in territory occurs.

The GNA, LNA and other Eastern actors such as the HoR face a number of pressures which encourage them back to the political process, including:

- Concerted international diplomatic pressure to bring them back to the process;
- Reduced international military support as a result of international agreements;
• Pressure due to the situation relating to COVID-19 affecting government priorities and the military capacity of their forces;
• A shift in public attitude due to changing humanitarian circumstances linked to public finances, or COVID-19 related impacts on the economy and humanitarian conditions.

The national parties to the political talks have significant distrust to one another and are hesitant to make concessions, but do not act entirely in bad faith. While the political process has not resulted in a new political agreement by the end of the 12-month scenario period, progress has been made towards a new political agreement reinvigorating the transitional process. Participation in the political talks leads to a reduction in violence and an effective freezing of military lines.

To support this, talk continues at the international level around a UN Security Council sanctioned international monitoring force, either led by the UN or as a multinational force, is agreed and deployed to monitor the ceasefire and promote the conditions necessary to negotiate and implement the transitional process. The monitoring force faces significant challenges, not least by the need to demobilise and reintegrate Libyan armed groups.

The improved security situation allows for oil production to restart in earnest. However, broader shocks to global oil markets as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic mean that economic revenues do not return to previous levels. International early recovery assistance is needed to support national authorities’ capacity to deliver basic services and some humanitarian assistance is required as public finances worsen.

Local conflicts continue to occur, especially given new tensions and grievances that have emerged as a result of the political polarisation and fighting from April 2019. International peacebuilding and mediation efforts support local capacities to respond to these.

Conflict sensitivity implications identified during groupwork

- Participants stressed the importance of international assistance providers supporting efforts towards moving in the direction outlined in the scenario.
- To that end, it is of essence that assistance providers maintain long term efforts along with responding to needs for emergency assistance. Indeed, the scenario presents opportunities to invest more in long term efforts promoting sustainable peace, including technical governance assistance and capacity building of governance structures, to support the transitional process and develop the foundations for a gradual institutional unification.
- A reinvigoration of the political process along with the challenge of responding to COVID-19 faced by all communities across the country may provide opportunities to bring people together and promote social cohesion, collaboration, and solidarity. With regards to the COVID-19 response, the National Centre for Disease Control may be an initial entry point through which to foster technical cooperation and galvanize governance initiatives around.

Scenario 2: Political division in the East leads to reinvigorated political process

Description of scenario

This scenario projects a situation where political competition in the East affects the willingness of national actors to engage in the political process, encouraging to tangible progress towards a political solution.

Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to consolidate control in the East is unsuccessful. Other political actors in the East see the need, and have public support, to attempt to sideline Haftar by reaching out to participate in the political process.

International diplomatic efforts consolidate behind a reinvigorated process, either under the rubric of the Berlin process or a new framework, placing pressure on the GNA and affiliated actors to participate. These do not initially do so in good faith, but are willing to consider some concessions.
Significant progress is made towards a new political agreement, laying out a new transitional process, which may or may not be agreed by the end of the scenario period. However, implementation of any agreement remains challenging in the face of spoilers on both sides and the need for acceptance by parties, including at the local level, who have not been party to the talks.

Haftar initially responds by trying to change realities on the ground and launching a new military offensive on Tripoli. However, these are unsuccessful and his international supporters are unwilling to increase their military support in the face of a new political process, resulting in ongoing fighting over the scenario period.

Haftar-affiliated LNA forces continue to leverage their control of oil production to exert pressure on political actors. Increasingly, they attempt to export oil outside the international legal framework to raise revenues themselves, but broader international efforts broadly curtail this. National political and military actors continue to operate with the financial support of international actors.

Within a year, the worsening economic situation as a result of lost oil revenues (due to the LNA blockade and global oil shocks generally) leads to reductions in payment of salaries, contributing to a worsening humanitarian need and declining access to basic services, requiring international humanitarian and resilience/early recovery assistance. This is worsened by COVID-19.

Local level conflicts flare up related to pressures on basic services and inter-communal distrust, both fuelled by COVID-19. However, political polarisation linked to national actors is reduced.

Conflict sensitivity implications identified during groupwork

▪ The significant shift in the governance landscape in the East envisioned in this scenario may present an opening to engage more with civilian authorities when providing assistance in areas under the control of Eastern authorities. In this case, international assistance providers may need to reconfigure assistance in terms of both the types assistance delivered and the modes of delivery. Understanding changes to stakeholder relations and power dynamics within key governance and military bodies and in specific locations of assistance will be essential.

▪ As international assistance providers are adapting to the shifting governance landscape, coordination and agreeing on a harmonised approach will be key. A fragmented and uncoordinated approach risks leading to conflicting or counterproductive initiatives.

▪ A harmonised and concerted approach can leverage stronger engagement with civilian authorities and the reinvigorated political process to support institution building, both vertically by strengthening the population’s trust in institutions, and horizontally, by linking ministries in the East and West to collaborate on joint pressing issues.

▪ The context outlined in the scenario may also be conducive to more local level programmes developing local resilience, such as those focussing on livelihoods and social cohesion.

▪ Connections across authorities and communities may be forged around health services and management of natural resources, and should, when possible, be tied into the political process.

Scenario 3: Political process stalled and frozen military stalemate

Description of scenario

This scenario projects a situation where international political processes formally continue, but without tangible outcomes. Violence continues, however the relative balance on both sides leads to a relative stalemate over the scenario period.

Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to consolidate control over the East is inconclusive. Haftar’s military influence is not particularly affected and he remains an important actor in the East, in effect
keeping the situation as before. Other political actors in the East, while distrustful of Haftar, still see the GNA as a more pressing rival.

International diplomatic efforts to push towards a ceasefire continue but do not result in an agreement over the scenario period, due to national actors’ unwillingness to engage with rivals and to the inability of major international actors to agree on a common approach.

International military support for national actors continues in a moderate manner, with direct military support, including military advisors, air support and deployment of proxy actors and mercenaries, as well as materiel support. However, no international actors are willing to significantly escalate military assistance further and international support to rival national actors effectively balances each other out.

The highly militarised situation effectively freezes the situation in place. Skirmishes and fighting continue, as through 2019, but attempts at major assaults are quickly repulsed. Lines of control remain effectively the same.

Haftar-affiliated Libyan National Army forces continue to leverage their control of oil production to exert pressure on the GNA. Increasingly, they attempt to export oil outside the international legal framework to raise revenues themselves, but broader international efforts broadly curtail this. National political and military actors continue to operate with the financial support of international actors.

Within a year, the worsening economic situation leads to reductions in payment of salaries, contributing to worsening humanitarian need and declining access to basic services. This, combined with continued impacts of fighting and the impacts of COVID-19, require international humanitarian and resilience/early recovery assistance. However, due to ongoing uncertainty in the security situation, access challenges continue.

Local level conflicts escalate in some areas as local tensions due to political polarisation boil over and as national actors attempt to create military opportunities outside of Tripoli to break the stalemate. These may become more frequent depending on how much pressure the COVID-19 pandemic places on basic services and inter-communal relations.

Conflict sensitivity implications identified during groupwork

- The ongoing instability and security challenges outlined in this scenario may reduce or disrupt access, including to reliable information. With remote management it may be increasingly difficult to obtain the necessary contextual knowledge and understanding to ensure conflict sensitivity. There is also a risk that such challenges to assistance delivery will disproportionately affect already marginalised areas like the south of the country.
- Efforts to support local resilience to prevent and readily respond to increased local tensions due to political polarisation and pressure on inter-communal tensions and stigmatisation of vulnerable groups as a result of the COVID-19 situation should be strengthened. Such efforts should be implemented in a coordinated and coherent manner, through existing or new inter-organisational working groups to avoid conflicting initiatives and increase joint impact.
- Opportunities to facilitate technical cooperation to cushion further institutional fragmentation and enable a potential future unification should be monitored and leveraged, however, participants assessed that such opportunities and their potentials appear unlikely in the outlined scenario.

Scenario 4: Political process stalled with escalating violence

Description of scenario

This scenario projects a situation where international efforts to promote a ceasefire are unsuccessful and international military assistance enables a brutal increase in violence as national actors focus on seeking a military solution.
Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to consolidate control over the East is inconclusive. However, his military influence not particularly affected, and he remains an important actor in the East, in effect keeping the situation as before. Other political actors in the East, while distrustful of Haftar, still see the GNA as a more pressing rival.

International diplomatic efforts to find a ceasefire stagnate as influential diplomatic actors are distracted by COVID-19 responses, national actors remain unwilling to engage and influential international actors provide diplomatic cover. This leads national actors to see a military solution as the only way forward.

International military support continues in a tit-for-tat way, with international actors seeking to ensure that their own national allies do not lose significant ground. This support enables fighters on the ground, including proxy actors and mercenaries, to attempt to make military gains both within and outside Tripoli. Significant street to street fighting is triggered in Tripoli and continues over the course of the scenario period.

Some territory may change hands during the course of the fighting. Fundamentally, however, by the end of the scenario period a military solution is not in sight for either side. Despite this, positions are hardened and neither side appears particularly willing to engage in political talks.

As a result of the increased violence, oil production does not resume significantly, eventually affecting payment of salaries and contributing to the humanitarian situation caused by fighting as well as by broader pressures such as COVID-19. Humanitarian access is affected by insecurity and the increasingly political lens through which different national factions see international support.

Local conflicts escalate when national actors seek to create new military opportunities. In the South, the concentration of fighting in the North-West contributes to a security vacuum, providing space for crime and for rival local factions to compete over control of resources and administrative power.

Conflict sensitivity implications identified during groupwork

- In the increasingly polarised environment portrayed in this scenario, conflict sensitivity of communications activities of international assistance providers becomes even more imperative. Conflict sensitivity must be applied to all types of communications, including public communications outputs to avoid exacerbating tensions, and operational communication with Libyan partners, counterparts and constituencies to ensure ongoing expectation management. If possible, outreach to communities should be strengthened to maintain access, increase trust and build relationships.
- As the increase in national level violence spills over into local areas, efforts must be strengthened to overcome access challenges and ensuring that assistance is distributed between communities and regions in a manner that is (perceived as) fair.
- In addition, there will be a need to monitor and respond to localised conflicts and identify and leverage localised peacebuilding opportunities within programming. In this regard, coordination and coherence of initiatives, in particular mediation efforts, is important to avoid duplication or conflicting initiatives and maximise joint impact.
- In the face of the worsening situation, international assistance providers must strengthen efforts to ensure continuity of programming, in particular long-term efforts aimed at building resilience, by reshaping activities and approaches to the context of COVID-19 and of increased instability, rather than halting programmes, when possible.

Scenario 5: Shift in authorities in the East, political process stalled with escalating violence

Description of scenario

This scenario projects a situation where international efforts to promote a ceasefire are unsuccessful and international military assistance enables a brutal increase in violence as national actors focus on seeking a military solution.
Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to consolidate control over the East is successful. He imposes military rule over the East, effectively nullifying civilian political leaders. While significant political opposition does remain, this is controlled with a hard security response that targets political and civil leaders.

The new military authorities in the East demonstrate complete unwillingness to engage in a political process and see a military solution as the only way forward.

International military support continues in a tit-for-tat way, with international actors seeking to ensure that their own national allies do not lose significant ground. This support enables fighters on the ground, including proxy actors and mercenaries, to attempt to make military gains both within and outside Tripoli. Significant street to street fighting is triggered in Tripoli and continues over the course of the scenario period.

Some territory may change hands during the course of the fighting. Fundamentally, however, by the end of the scenario period a military solution is not in sight for either side. Despite this, positions are hardened and neither side appears particularly willing to engage in political talks.

LNA forces continue to leverage their control of oil production to exert pressure on the GNA. Increasingly, they attempt to export oil outside the international legal framework to raise revenues themselves, but broader international efforts broadly curtail this. National political and military actors continue to operate with the financial support of international actors.

The lack of oil revenues eventually affects payment of salaries and contributes to the worsening humanitarian situation caused by fighting and by broader pressures such as COVID-19. Humanitarian access is affected by insecurity and the increasingly political lens through which different national factions see international support.

Local conflicts escalate when national actors seek to create new military opportunities. In the South, the concentration of fighting in the North-West contributes to a security vacuum, providing space for crime and for rival local factions to compete over control of resources and administrative power.

Group work was not conducted around this scenario, and therefore, no conflict sensitivity implications specific to the scenario were identified during the session.

**Scenario 6: Significant military gains by LNA**

**Description of scenario**

This scenario projects a situation where determinative international support contributes to a significant advance by LNA forces.

Khalifa Haftar’s efforts to consolidate power in the East is either inconclusive, resulting in no significant change to the configuration of political actors, or is successful.

International diplomatic efforts to promote a ceasefire break down as influential international actors supporting the LNA demonstrate willingness to significantly escalate their military support. This is not counter-balanced by international actors supporting the other side, due to concerns of sparking broader international tensions, other international concerns, or lack of resources.

The increase in military support allows the LNA to launch assaults and make steady military gains with the result that the balance of power is significantly altered. Some armed groups supporting the GNA switch sides. Nevertheless, total victory is not achieved by the LNA within the year of the scenario period, with either pockets of resistance persisting in Tripoli and control of large parts of the North West still divided.

The humanitarian situation worsens significantly as a result of fighting, ongoing economic uncertainty caused by the lack of oil production and the COVID-19 pandemic. Humanitarian access is limited in areas of fighting and national actors seek to redirect humanitarian and resilience/early recovery assistance for their own purposes.
Local conflicts escalate as the changes in the national balance of power impact political divisions within and between communities. In many instances, local conflict resilience mechanisms are unable to cope with these, leading to violence.

The military success of the LNA emboldens them politically. In areas under their control, particularly newly captured areas, they proceed to identify and attack members of the public seen to have sympathies for their rivals. This includes human rights abuses and leads to the sharp deterioration in space for civil society and free media.

**Conflict sensitivity implications identified during groupwork**

- Participants pointed to the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity when adapting and responding to COVID-19, including avoiding that key efforts which are not COVID-19 related are not deprioritised. When possible, international assistance providers should attempt to identify cross-cutting issues and take coherent approaches as to ensure that sufficient efforts are directed towards addressing COVID-19 without significantly compromising other important initiatives.

- Increased military success by Haftar and the LNA may reinforce a securitised response to COVID-19 and governance in general in areas under their control. This may restrict humanitarian access in these areas, making it difficult to respond to emerging humanitarian needs as a result of violence and COVID-19. In this context, it will be important for international assistance providers to agree on a common approach to negotiating humanitarian access and relating to increasingly militarised local governance structures, to enable a concerted response that minimises harm. A similar common stance should be agreed on how to relate to militarised national governance structures as Haftar and the LNA takes control over more territory.

- Efforts to support community-based mechanisms to strengthen local resilience should be increased to mitigate and manage local level conflicts, and provide reconciliation and psychosocial report to minimise the toll of the legacy of conflict.