



Conflict Sensitive Assistance in Libya

Conflict Sensitivity Risks, Trade-offs and Opportunities in Libya

A resource for assistance providers

June 2022

What is conflict sensitivity?

Conflict sensitivity is about recognising we cannot separate our humanitarian, development and political assistance from the conflict context in which we work.

All our interventions will *interact* with the peace and conflict context and this interaction may have *positive* and/ or *negative effects* on that context.

Being conflict sensitive involves adopting a **deliberate and systematic approach** to ensuring we understand, monitor and minimise these negative effects (risks) and maximise the positive effects of our actions (opportunities). It requires:

- 1) Understanding the context by drawing on analysis;
- 2) Understanding the interactions between the intervention and the context by identifying risks and opportunities;
- 3) Acting on that understanding to monitor and minimise harm and maximise positive effects.

This resource paper is intended to give assistance providers an awareness of some of the common conflict sensitivity risks and trade-offs associated with policy and programming in the current Libyan context, and tangible ideas on how to respond to these in a way that will maximise the potential for positive effects. It presents common conflict sensitivity risks, opportunities, trade-offs and responses in a matrix format.

It builds on insights from PCi's work to strengthen conflict sensitivity in Libya through the Conflict Sensitive Assistance (CSA) Forum and related activities. It is a tool to augment resources such as the *Conflict Sensitivity Manual for Libya*,¹ which includes details about how to use the tool and to adapt it for assistance providers' specific activities.

The resource is aimed at a wide audience, as conflict sensitivity requires actions and communication across different levels (policy, programme, projects - national and local) and is relevant to all types of assistance (humanitarian, development and political and security). It is worth noting that, even where conflict sensitivity issues emerge for agencies that stem from policy positions and thereby

¹ Available at <https://www.peacefulchange.org/resources>

require actions taken at that level, individual agencies will still need to minimise the impact on their work and have a role to play in advocating for change across the system.

This matrix is not a substitute for actors undertaking their own context analysis and intervention specific conflict sensitivity assessments nor is it exhaustive of all the conflict sensitivity interactions encountered by assistance in Libya. It does however provide a starting point by flagging up some of the major conflict sensitivity issues present in the current Libyan context which can then be explored further through more in-depth processes of ongoing analysis, monitoring and review.

Changes to the peace and conflict context in Libya will increase or decrease risks or their impacts or present new risks and opportunities. Therefore, the resource is intended to be a living document, updated periodically in response to the changing peace and conflict context in Libya.

What is a CS risk, opportunity or trade-off?

A conflict sensitivity **risk** relates to the potential of a project/ programme to negatively impact on the conflict or vice versa (e.g. by reinforcing inequality).

A conflict sensitivity **trade-off** is a situation where any course of action (even stopping a programme) risks generating some harm. Conflict sensitivity sometimes means navigating difficult trade-offs and making decisions based on an ongoing understanding of the balance between benefits and harms in a given situation.

A conflict sensitivity **opportunity** is the potential for a project (within its objectives) to positively impact on the peace and conflict situation (e.g. by building trust between groups).

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
1	<p>Regional inequalities in assistance</p> <p>(Distribution effect)</p>	<p>Perceived or actual inequalities in the regional distribution of international assistance between the East, West and South may play into a sense of marginalisation in the South or the East (in particular) and be exploited by political actors for narratives of exclusion.</p> <p>Focus in some areas of the country may occur due to needs or due to access limitations. Even if international assistance is equally distributed or disproportionately goes to the South or the East, perceptions of unequal distribution may exist and may be enhanced by skewed visibility (physical presence and communications) in the West and association of international assistance providers with national authorities based in the West.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Collectively review regional distribution of assistance cross-referencing against criteria such as needs, population size etc.</p> <p>Ensure communications around assistance shows distribution going to different parts of the country.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>When possible, adjust distribution of assistance.</p> <p>If necessary, adapt communications activities.</p>	<p>Collectively monitor assistance flows by geographical location and ensure that information feeds into decision-making and coordination around distribution of assistance.</p> <p>Monitor commentary around distribution of assistance and narratives of regional exclusion.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
2	<p>Local inequalities in assistance</p> <p>(Distribution effect)</p>	<p>In local contexts characterised by inter-communal divisions, unequal access and distribution of international assistance (in terms of quantity, quality, employment opportunities etc.) can reinforce feelings of exclusion and inequality and increase divisions and tensions between groups. This can lead to a potentially violent reaction by groups perceived to be excluded.</p> <p>This is a particular risk where those associated with delivering assistance (municipal authorities, local partners) are dominated by one communal/tribal group. They may seek to channel assistance towards their own group.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Engage with staff, local leaders and local conflict management mechanisms to understand perceptions of migrants and potential backlash and how to mitigate it.</p> <p>To the extent possible, ensure that assistance benefits both migrants and Libyan communities. When possible, build in mechanisms that seek to develop relationships between migrants and Libyans.</p> <p>Ensure clear and proactive communication about criteria for distribution of assistance and demonstrate value of assistance locally.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>If tensions or dissatisfaction arise, ensure clear communication about criteria for distribution of assistance and demonstrate value of assistance locally.</p> <p>Engage with local leaders and local conflict management mechanisms to communicate with communities.</p> <p>If possible, explore options to also provide support to Libyan communities as well.</p>	<p>Monitor local perceptions of assistance delivery and of migrants, for example through local feedback mechanisms.</p> <p>Engage with local conflict management mechanisms where they exist in monitoring implementation.</p> <p>Monitor and log complaints about assistance deliver to migrants, negative narratives towards migrants and incidents of violence towards migrants.</p> <p>Ensure regular exchanges between local staff and programme manager on community perceptions and reactions.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
3.a	Focus on migrants (Distribution effect)	Actual or perceived focus on delivering assistance to migrants (and IDPs) may cause anger from other residents who feel like they are also in need. This can contribute to worsening negative sentiment and poor treatment, including violence, towards migrants. There may also be resistance to assistance delivered to migrants.	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Engage with staff, local leaders and local conflict management mechanisms to understand perceptions of migrants and potential backlash and how to mitigate it.</p> <p>To the extent possible, ensure that assistance benefits both migrants and Libyan communities. When possible, build in mechanisms that seek to develop relationships between migrants and Libyans.</p> <p>Ensure clear and proactive communication about criteria for distribution of assistance and demonstrate value of assistance locally.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>If tensions or dissatisfaction arise, ensure clear communication about criteria for distribution of assistance and demonstrate value of assistance locally.</p> <p>Engage with local leaders and local conflict management mechanisms to communicate with communities.</p> <p>If possible, explore options to also provide support to Libyan communities as well.</p>	<p>Monitor local perceptions of assistance delivery and of migrants, for example through local feedback mechanisms.</p> <p>Engage with local conflict management mechanisms where they exist in monitoring implementation.</p> <p>Monitor and log complaints about assistance delivered to migrants, negative narratives towards migrants and incidents of violence towards migrants.</p> <p>Ensure regular exchanges between local staff and programme manager on community perceptions and reactions.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
3.b	Focus on migrants (Attention effect)	A focus of assistance on migrants and IDPs, although important issues, means that political focus is centred on those issues and could mean that less attention is paid to structural drivers of conflict. It can also incentivize political and armed actors to get engaged in the sector and use that engagement for their own gain, or enable those who are controlling migrants to claim legitimacy or justify actions.	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Ensure that assistance priorities and frameworks seek to adopt strategic approaches to addressing issues around migration while also addressing structural driver of conflict (and of migration).</p> <p>Lower or reframe communication around assistance to migrants and emphasise benefits for the wider population.</p> <p>Ensure attention is also being paid including in communication to structural drivers of conflict.</p> <p>Avoid incentivizing (armed) actors to engage in migration governance.</p>	<p>Monitor perceptions of migrants and perceptions of assistance priorities and effectiveness.</p> <p>Collectively map and monitor assistance flows to migrants and to addressing structural drivers of conflict and migration.</p>
3.c	Focus on migrants (Prioritisation effect)	<p>A focus of assistance on migrants and IDPs, although important issues, means that funds are being directed towards those issues potentially at the expense of addressing structural drivers of conflict that also contribute to causing or worsening migration and IDP issues.</p> <p>Prioritisation of migrants and IDPs can also contribute to decreasing trust in international assistance providers as some partners, counterparts and the wider population perceive that this focus is based on the interests of donors rather than on the needs perceived by Libyans.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Ensure that assistance priorities and frameworks seek to adopt strategic approaches to addressing issues around migration while also addressing structural driver of conflict (and of migration).</p> <p>Lower or reframe communication around assistance to migrants and emphasise benefits for the wider population.</p>	<p>Monitor perceptions of migrants and perceptions of assistance priorities and effectiveness.</p> <p>Collectively map and monitor assistance flows to migrants and to addressing structural drivers of conflict and migration.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
4	<p>Providing recognition to competing governance actors</p> <p>(Recognition effect)</p>	<p>International assistance can provide recognition to national governance actors or political processes they are promoting either explicitly or indirectly by engaging with them. This can empower some actors over others in a polarised landscape feeding into competition. The impact is particularly strong in the current context where the Government of Unity (GNU) and the Government of Stability (GNS) both claim to be the legitimate government.</p> <p>If different international assistance providers adopt diverging approaches, that might cause harm while offsetting the potential positive impact.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Agree on collective approaches and principles towards working with different authorities in Libya in order to manage the issue consistently. This involves recognising and articulating the costs and benefits associated with any course of action when engaging with authorities.</p> <p>Engage in clear and coherent messaging (by international and local partners) towards national and local counterparts as well as the population more widely on the principles and basis for international engagement.</p> <p>When necessary, put in place measures to decrease the association risks. E.g. by lowering visibility of support and adjusting communication strategies.</p>	<p>Monitor reactions to communications content with national authorities.</p> <p>Monitor local perceptions of international assistance actors (e.g. via media monitoring, perception surveys).</p>
5	<p>Providing recognition to undemocratic or non-inclusive governance approaches</p> <p>(Recognition effect)</p>	<p>International assistance can provide recognition to governance actors or political processes they are promoting either explicitly or indirectly by engaging with them.</p> <p>Working through authorities that are using undemocratic or non-inclusive approaches can provide recognition to such approaches which can bolster ideas that they are more effective and/or reinforce feelings of exclusion.</p> <p>On the other hand, recognition provided to governance actors that follow democratic and inclusive approaches can support such actors and approaches.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Maintain ongoing understanding of level of inclusivity of authorities and perceptions of them by different communal groups.</p> <p>In the given location, agree on a common approach to engagement with authorities.</p> <p>If authorities are elected, advocate for and support authorities to adopt more inclusive approaches.</p> <p>If authorities are not elected, decrease visibility and association with authorities and engage only at a technical and project-related basis.</p>	<p>Monitor perceptions of authorities and feelings of exclusion for example through analysis of Libyan staff, perception surveys and engagement with communal leaders, civil society and conflict management mechanisms.</p> <p>Monitor progress in inclusive approaches by authorities.</p> <p>Monitor narratives and reactions to communications around support provided to local authorities.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
6	<p>Political or armed actors may instrumentalise assistance to build their own support</p> <p>(Recognition effect)</p>	<p>Political or armed actors may seek to instrumentalise international assistance to support their own agendas. This can occur at all levels, from the national level and interactions with government authorities to local communities. For example, they may try to increase visibility of their engagement with international actors to bolster their credibility and legitimacy</p> <p>This also increases the likelihood of political capture of international assistance.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Ensure ongoing understanding of relationships and interests of relevant political and armed actors through analysis, engaging with Libyan staff and partners and media monitoring.</p> <p>Put in place measures to decrease the association risks. E.g. by lowering visibility of support and adjusting communication strategies.</p> <p>Engage in clear and coherent messaging (by international and local partners) towards national and local counterparts as well as the population more widely on the principles and basis for international engagement.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>Interrogate the motivations of requests from political counterparts and push back on requests that may be politically motivated.</p>	<p>Monitor changes to interests and relationships of relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>Monitor and log attempts at instrumentalising assistance for recognition, for example through analysis of Libyan staff and media monitoring.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
7	<p>Assistance stolen by armed groups or other actors</p> <p>(Theft / diversion effect)</p>	<p>Assistance may be stolen by armed groups or other actors for their own benefit or for reuse/resale. This can occur at checkpoints, from warehouses, from service facilities (for example health equipment being stolen) or in other ways and could be used to supply or fund armed group activities. When assistance goods are found on local illicit markets, that can further contribute to undermining trust in international assistance and local authorities.</p>	<p>Mitigation:</p> <p>Maintain an analysis of key stakeholders relating to armed groups, where they are operating and types of behaviour.</p> <p>Engage closely with local authorities and leaders who have influence over armed groups to ensure that activities are communicated clearly and with local ownership.</p> <p>Ensure local implementing partners have good relationships with local authorities and leaders.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>Refuse to hand over assistance to armed groups wherever safe and possible to do so.</p> <p>Identify relevant actors involved and document incidents.</p> <p>Communicate with authorities and community leaders to apply pressure on armed groups to allow assistance to move unhindered and to prevent recurrence.</p> <p>Look to alternative partnerships where partners do not have necessary relationships with authorities.</p>	<p>Monitor changes to stakeholder relationships, including armed groups, and behaviour.</p> <p>Monitor and log incidents of missing assistance, including reasons for disappearance and stakeholder involved.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
8	<p>Authorities or armed groups divert assistance</p> <p>(Theft / diversion effect)</p>	<p>Authorities may use their influence on beneficiary selection processes to prioritise members of communities or groups which they would like to favour, for political or communal reasons. This could play into existing tensions and perceptions of inequalities between communities.</p> <p>Armed groups may be able to divert assistance through influence on authorities, influence on suppliers or partners, including by demanding protection or access money from partners or suppliers. This can strengthen them financially and strengthen their role in society.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Maintain analysis of relationships between key stakeholders (authorities, armed groups, suppliers and partners) and their relations to communal groups.</p> <p>Incorporate enquiries about militia relationships into due diligence processes when choosing partners and business to support.</p> <p>Query communal or conflict-group bias within selection verification processes.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>Work with crisis committees, relevant community leadership groups and conflict management mechanisms to communicate basis for distribution.</p> <p>Reassess distribution/delivery where and if appropriate based on understanding of the extent of the problem and its impact, including trade-offs. If changes are made or assistance is stopped, the reasons need to be clearly communicated and the risks of stopping (on the community, perceptions etc.) also weighed up and mitigated.</p>	<p>Monitor changes to stakeholder relationships.</p> <p>Monitor and log incidents of attempts at diversion, including stakeholders involved.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
9	<p>Bringing communal groups together may increase or address tensions</p> <p>(Social capital effect)</p>	<p>Assistance delivery may engage with or bring actors or communal groups together between whom there are tensions. If this is not managed properly, it can trigger conflict incidents and heighten tensions.</p> <p>Conversely, well thought through engagement strategies that bring different actors/groups together in a sensitive manner, open avenues for local dialogue and collective problem solving and provide a platform to bridge divides and enhance local accountability can support improvement in relationships.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Maintain ongoing analysis of relationships between relevant communal groups and stakeholders to assess level of risk and identify entry points for relationship building.</p> <p>Where the risk of inter-communal tensions is high and there is no scope for processes to address this, separate distribution to groups (geographically or in terms of time).</p> <p>When possible, build in relationships building mechanisms into assistance delivery through identified entry points.</p> <p>Engage with community leaders, crisis committees and conflict management mechanisms to develop analysis and deliver assistance.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>If tensions occur, engage with community leaders, crisis committees and conflict management mechanisms to defuse tensions and decide on alternative distribution mechanisms.</p>	<p>Monitor (changes to) relationships between relevant communal groups and stakeholders, including incidents of violence or disagreement or incidents of collaboration.</p> <p>Monitor incidents of violence or disagreement relating to international assistance.</p> <p>Monitor the quality of interactions and mutual perceptions during delivery of assistance.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
10	<p>Providing contracts to business with relations to armed actors</p> <p>(Economic market effect)</p>	<p>Assistance providers may contract suppliers, businesses or other partners that have connections to armed actors. Armed actors may have direct or indirect ownership of businesses, close connections to them or they may demand protection or access payments. This can lead to financial resources going to armed actors and to strengthening their position in society.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Incorporate enquiries about armed actor relationships into due diligence processes when choosing partners, suppliers and business to support.</p> <p>Refresh due diligence checks periodically. Consider a mechanism to share due diligence information with other international assistance providers.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>If evidence of armed group relations with a partner or business becomes clear, seek to understand the extent of the problem, trade-offs by continuing or stopping the collaboration to inform decision-making.</p>	<p>Monitor influence of armed actors on businesses and the relevant sectors.</p> <p>Log incidents of armed groups involvement for future due diligence.</p>
11	<p>Assistance promotes licit economic activities at the expense of illicit economic activities</p> <p>(Economic market effect)</p>	<p>Assistance that develops jobs and builds capacities in the licit economy can contribute to strengthening the licit economy and support people to move from the illicit to the licit economy. Such approaches must be based on understanding of the drivers of illicit economic activities and incentives for joining them. However, it is important that such approaches ensure local sustainability and avoid leading to dependency on assistance.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Develop understanding of drivers of illicit economic activities and incentives for participating in them rather than in licit economic activities.</p> <p>Ensure that project design builds on the analysis.</p>	<p>Monitor changes to dynamics around the illicit and licit economy.</p> <p>Monitor impact of assistance deliver on illicit and licit economy (such as number of trainees who switched from illicit economic activities to licit economic activities).</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
12	<p>Demonstrating (non)inclusive and (un)accountable assistance approaches</p> <p>(Modelling behaviour effect)</p>	<p>Assistance activities delivered in a way that is unaccountable, non-inclusive, or focuses on delivery over process, legitimises such approaches to counterparts, partners, communities and other stakeholders.</p> <p>Stakeholders may mirror the behaviour of staff of international assistance providers and adopt similar approaches, including unaccountable and non-inclusive approaches.</p> <p>Conversely, assistance delivered in a way that encourages inclusive and participatory processes, following defined processes, may strengthen the place of such approaches as conflict management mechanisms.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Embed inclusive approaches and a focus on proper processes over rapid delivery in project design and delivery.</p> <p>Develop the capacity of staff to act in transparent, inclusive and accountable ways towards counterparts, partners and communities.</p> <p>Have accountability mechanisms in place such as feedback mechanisms that are understood and accessible by communities.</p> <p>Ensure space for open and constructive reflection with Libyan staff around interactions with counterparts, communities and partners.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>Work to understand how behaviour of counterparts, partners and communities may have mirrored behaviour of assistance providers.</p> <p>Engage in clear communication to communicate values of inclusivity, transparency and accountability and demonstrate that actions are taken to adapt behaviour.</p>	<p>Monitor (non)inclusive, (un)accountable) and (un)transparent behaviour of counterparts, partners and communities and seek to understand reasons/motivations for behaviour.</p> <p>Capture lessons learned from reflections around assistance approaches and interactions with counterparts, communities and partners.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
13	<p>Non-inclusive and accountable Internationally led political processes</p> <p>(Modelling behaviour effect)</p>	<p>Internationally led political processes that are non-inclusive, unaccountable and focus on expediency over process legitimises such approaches to national political and armed actors who may in turn adopt them to pursue conflict-fuelling objectives.</p> <p>It also leads to a lack of trust in the international community which affects its ability to support Libya to transition towards sustainable peace and can reflect negatively on international assistance at large.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Ensure that internationally led political processes are designed and implemented in an inclusive, accountable and transparent manner that prioritises process over expediency and communicate clearly about the importance of these values.</p> <p>Build in mechanisms in internationally led processes that ensure inputs are taken into account from the wider population, that allow for feedback and ensure that major concerns are responded to.</p>	<p>Monitor (non)inclusive, (un)accountable and (un)transparent behaviour of counterparts, partners and communities and seek to understand reasons/motivations for behaviour.</p> <p>Monitor perceptions of internationally led political processes, for example through media monitoring and perception surveys.</p> <p>Capture lessons learned from previous and ongoing internationally led processes and feed learning into design and adaptation.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
14	<p>Providing support to local authorities</p> <p>(Capacity effect)</p>	<p>Providing assistance to local governance structures in the absence of a clear decentralisation framework where local authorities act with a high degree of autonomy and in the context of divisions in national government risks contributing to centrifugal dynamics. This is the case especially if approaches between assistance providers are not aligned/harmonised and are not embedded in current and potential decentralisation frameworks, including legislation and regulatory frameworks. This means that municipalities may be being empowered in different ways and to different degrees, complicating future development of governance. It may also feed into power dynamics between local and national authorities.</p> <p>On the other hand, defining a harmonised approach, contextualised within Libya's governance framework, may provide an opportunity to bring local and national authorities together in a way that contributes to addressing Libya's fragmented governance environment.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Develop a collectively consistent, nuanced and coordinated response on working through local governance structures and on local governance issues in the changing context.</p> <p>This extends to communication on the role of central government actors in programmes and considering ways that the delivery of support can enhance relations between different actors (e.g. between municipalities or between municipalities and the centre).</p> <p>Ensure that project design is informed by understanding of political dynamics between national and local governance actors and embedded within Libya's current and potential decentralisation framework.</p>	<p>Collectively monitor support and capacity-building provided to different municipalities.</p> <p>Monitor development in political dynamics between national and local governance actors.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
15	<p>Strengthening capacities to manage conflict</p> <p>(Capacity effect)</p>	<p>Assistance can support existing capacities for managing and resolving conflict either as part of main project objectives or by integrating support and engagement into assistance approaches where possible.</p> <p>Support can be through trainings, joint analysis, convening different actors who have capacities in one space and facilitating collaboration between them etc.</p> <p>This helps strengthen capacities for managing and resolving conflict to prevent incidents from escalating.</p>	<p><u>Adaptation:</u></p> <p>Develop understanding of existing or potential capacities and mechanisms for conflict management in project locations.</p> <p>Work with existing capacities to understand their needs for support and integrate approaches to providing that support into project development.</p> <p>Ensure flexibility in approaches to iteratively build on continuing progress and to respond to incidents or changes in the context.</p>	<p>Monitor changes in capacities for conflict management, including emergence of new mechanisms.</p> <p>Monitor incidents where local capacities/mechanisms have been involved in managing, resolving or deescalating conflict.</p>
16	<p>Lack of strategic prioritisation and assistance frameworks</p> <p>(Prioritisation effect)</p>	<p>Lack of strategic approaches to peacebuilding in assistance that focus on particular issues in isolation rather than dealing with structural issues undermines effectiveness of assistance to contribute to peace.</p> <p>On the other hand, strategic and coherent assistance approaches that leverage linkages between national level peacebuilding work and local work and between peacebuilding work and other sectors optimise assistance effectiveness and contributions to peace.</p>	<p><u>Adaptation:</u></p> <p>Develop collective priorities and frameworks for peacebuilding assistance building on conflict analysis and existing work in this field.</p> <p>Develop mechanisms for coordination and enabling complementarity between national-level work and local level peacebuilding work.</p> <p>Develop or make effective use of existing mechanisms for coordination and enabling complementarity between peacebuilding work and work in other sectors when feasible.</p> <p>Periodically, or in case of major changes to the context, collectively reflect on priorities for peace. For example, by planning according to scenarios.</p>	<p>Monitor and share changes to the peace and conflict context.</p> <p>Collectively monitor peacebuilding assistance, including impact.</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
17	<p>A focus on immediate needs deprioritises efforts to promote long term peace and stability</p> <p>(Prioritisation effect)</p>	<p>In response to immediate needs or changes in the operating environment, there may be a temptation to suspend longer-term programming and focus on addressing immediate short-term needs.</p> <p>This may lead to de-prioritisation of issues that need to be addressed to promote medium or long-term stability and peace.</p>	<p><u>Adaptation:</u></p> <p>Develop collective and long-term assistance priorities and frameworks that seek to address both long-term and immediate needs.</p> <p>Avoid deprioritising assistance aimed at addressing the structural drivers of conflict where possible (e.g. promoting social cohesion or inclusive service delivery).</p> <p>Periodically, or in case of major changes to the context, collectively reflect on how assistance may need to be adapted to the evolving context and respond to existing and emerging conflict drivers. For example, by planning according to scenarios.</p>	<p>Monitor and share changes to the context, including peace and conflict dynamics.</p> <p>Collectively monitor assistance flows by type (immediate humanitarian assistance vs. longer term engagement) in order to understand how the conflict is impacting on the nature of assistance</p>

	Interaction	Description	Mitigation/ response / adaptation	Approach to monitoring
18	<p>Assistance contributes to improving or worsening gender dynamics</p> <p>(Attention effect)</p>	<p>Women in Libya face structural obstacles to being able to pursue their political, social and economic rights and play an active part in peace promotion.</p> <p>Addressing gender inequality and promoting women's engagement in peacebuilding is critical for long term prospects for stability. However, if not undertaken with sensitivity and with a strong understanding of local conflict and gender norms, efforts to support women's empowerment can lead to a (sometimes violent) backlash and increased resistance to women's participation.</p>	<p><u>Mitigation:</u></p> <p>Integrate gender dimensions within assessments to understand how issues affect men, women, boys and girls differently and how efforts to empower women may be perceived.</p> <p>Ensure that design of activities is informed by in-depth understanding of local gender dynamics and how they relate to conflict.</p> <p>Engage with existing local capacities who can advise on approaches. Build on and support existing initiatives and capacities launched by local CSOs and activists.</p> <p>Engage with local authorities and leaders on the importance of participation and empowerment of women.</p> <p>Identify male and female "champions" who are respected and trusted by communities and can mobilise support for activities.</p> <p>Start with pilots which are carefully monitored and scale up when successful.</p> <p><u>Response:</u></p> <p>In case of backlash, ensure safety of affected women. Engage with local capacities such as conflict management mechanisms, crisis committees, local authorities and local leaders to de-escalate the situation.</p> <p>Avoid pushing through delivery of activities but undertake an assessment of needs for adjustment of activities to prevent further harm.</p>	<p>Monitor incidents of intimidation, obstruction or objection to activities addressing gender dynamics or involving women.</p> <p>Monitor outcomes from initiatives aimed at addressing gender dynamics or supporting women.</p> <p>Monitor changes to gender dynamics, such as narratives around perceptions of women's roles in society.</p> <p>Ensure disaggregation of all monitoring data.</p>