

# CONFLICT SENSITIVITY MANUAL FOR LIBYA

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## CONFLICT SENSITIVE ASSISTANCE IN LIBYA



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## Section 1: Conflict sensitivity in Libya: the basics

This section provides an introduction to conflict sensitivity and how it is applied.

### 1.1 Characteristics of the peace and conflict context in Libya

#### *Defining conflict*

The concept of conflict is often used in reference to *violent* conflict, whether inter-personally between individuals, locally between different groups, nationally between competing stakeholders or internationally between states. However, conflict is not inherently violent, nor even an inherently negative phenomenon. In fact, it is a common part of life and society that occurs *when two or more parties (believe they) have incompatible differences*. In some contexts, conflict can be a driver of positive and constructive change in society; in others, it may cause negative dynamics and erupt into violence. Even in the absence of violence, it is important to understand the underlying structural factors that are driving peace and conflict in a given context. A helpful illustration is to think of conflict as a volcano: the magma bubbling under the surface represents the structural factors that are driving peace and conflict. If these are unaddressed, an eruption (of violence) may be triggered. It is these structural factors that characterise the peace and conflict environment, and that we must understand in order to deliver assistance in a conflict-sensitive way.

#### *Libya's peace and conflict environment*

Libya's peace and conflict environment is complex, working at multiple levels and with a diversity of actors. PCI's analysis views it in terms of three overlapping conflict systems:

- a conflict over the structure of the Libyan state and who controls it which plays out at the national political level;
- a series of local-level conflicts within and between communities over control of local economic resources, access to administrative rights and inter-communal relations; and
- the role of international actors within Libya, which both seek to help Libya transition towards sustainable peace and compete over advancing their own interests in the country.

Each of these conflict systems are interrelated and feed into one another. However, each also retains its own dynamics.

#### *National conflict*

Nationally, the fundamental questions raised by the 2011 revolution have yet to be resolved. These questions, concerning the political structure of the Libyan state, who governs the country, and how economic resources are shared among Libyans, are the issues around which national level political and conflict actors compete. Until they are resolved, Libya will remain in a 'transitional' phase.

As a consequence of this transitional status, Libya does not have clearly established rules of political behaviour, defined either institutionally or by convention, which would inform the ways in which actors pursue their objectives. In addition, armed groups have become so entrenched in the political and institutional framework of Libya that they are able to significantly influence decision making, undermining the rule of law. Uncompromising, winner-takes-all approaches to politics are the norm, and are backed up by the constant threat of the use of political violence when other means are unsuccessful.

Economic factors are also important conflict dynamics. National conflict actors compete to secure influence over key financial institutions or control over economic infrastructure such as oil, from which they seek to derive political and/or financial benefit. At the same time, broader concerns over economic inequality between regions contribute to negative perceptions of authorities and to hardening regional identities between Libya's West, East and South.

The national conflict system oscillates between periods of significant violence and calmer periods when conflict plays out predominantly at a political level. 2019 and 2020 witnessed a more violent period, with significant fighting between Libyan National Army (LNA) armed groups aligned with Khalifa Haftar and armed groups affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in the outskirts of Tripoli – alongside growing separation of governance between West and East. Following the defeat of LNA forces, the opportunity presented itself for a renewal of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)-led political process, the formation of a new Government of National Unity (GNU) and the holding of elections slated for December 2021. However, the planned elections were postponed indefinitely and a dispute over who has governance authority has emerged, with the House of Representatives (HoR) seeking to establish a new interim government to replace the GNU, while the GNU maintains that it should remain in office. Many of the fundamental drivers of conflict at the national level remain and there is a great deal of uncertainty around the outcome of the national governance dispute, whether the elections will eventually be held and, if they are held, whether they will lead to longer-term stability or trigger more violence.

### *Local conflict*

The national-level conflict since 2011 in Libya has fostered a broader environment of political instability and insecurity. That environment has allowed problems at the local level to escalate more easily into significant tensions, in many cases turning violent, and leaving existing community-level conflict response and mitigation mechanisms overwhelmed.

Local conflicts in Libya occur between communities within a geographic area, driven by inter-communal tensions based on historic grievances and on perceived or actual administrative, economic and social inequalities. In some areas, the overlapping presence of armed or criminal groups raises the risk of violence as they may compete locally over control of licit and illicit economic activities, political influence, or influence over key institutions. Gender norms that conflate masculinity with taking up arms encourage men to join armed groups and decrease space for moderate voices.

Politically, local conflict actors maintain significant practical autonomy from national institutions and side with national conflict actors based on calculations of political benefit, personal and social relationships and ideological similarities. In turn, they are able to use support from national actors to strengthen their position locally vis-à-vis rivals, which may contribute to fuelling conflict locally.

Historically, communities have had capacities to resolve disputes at the local level by leveraging traditional and religious community leaders, either within or from outside the local area, who have used established social conventions of censure and compensation to deescalate issues before or after they have turned violent. However, Libya's broader instability since 2011, together with longer-term social and demographic changes, have weakened these traditional structures and they are not always able to respond adequately. Moreover, many local peace mechanisms continue to be reactive to conflict and, where they are successful, serve primarily to address immediate tensions rather than sustainably address the root causes of problems.

Since 2011, Libyan civil society has emerged, and some organisations and activists seek to resolve conflict. However, civil society operates within a limited civic space and is often targeted by conflict actors. Still, it serves as an important channel for young people and women who otherwise face structural exclusion from participation in society and from decision-making processes, underpinned by gender norms that do not encourage women's participation.

### *Libya within its international context*

The third conflict system in Libya consists of how international actors engage in Libya: on the one hand seeking to support the country to transition to sustainable peace, while on the other hand seeking to promote geopolitical interests in the Libyan context.

International engagement in Libya has played a constraining role within both national and local level conflicts. International diplomatic pressure has encouraged actors to engage in the political process and, while not always effective, constrained the use of violence. International aid assistance has lessened the impact of conflict for Libyans while also attempting to augment the political process by supporting internationally recognised governance institutions.

On the other hand, international engagement in Libya has played an enabling role in conflict. Provision of materiel and diplomatic support to national and local actors has increased those actors' capacities to engage in violence to pursue their ends. Foreign fighters and mercenaries are also openly present and have been involved in fighting. These include both non-state foreign armed groups, such as from Sudan and Chad, but also state-linked groups including Turkish military, the Russian Wagner group and Syrian fighters sponsored by states.

While the specific objectives for foreign engagement in Libya are often opaque, foreign engagement occurs within a broader context of regional tensions, and foreign actors appear to be broadly motivated by a desire to constrain or disrupt regional competitors, or to secure the promise of future economic or geo-strategic opportunities.

### **1.2 What is conflict sensitivity and why is it important in Libya?**

#### ***Conflict sensitivity is:***

**Acting** with the understanding that any intervention and project will interact with the peace and conflict context and that such interaction may have positive or negative effects.

It is a ***deliberate, continual and systematic*** approach to ensuring we understand and ***minimise negative effects*** (risks) and ***maximise positive effects*** (opportunities) of our actions.

Conflict sensitivity emerges from the recognition that all assistance – whether humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, political or security – cannot be separated from the conflict context in which it is delivered. Whether an intervention is focused on responding directly to conflict (e.g. peacebuilding), mitigating its consequences (e.g. through provision of humanitarian assistance) or undertaking activities that may seem unrelated to conflict (e.g. enhancing skills, improving access to healthcare, or local sanitation), it will invariably interact with peace and conflict dynamics in one way or another.

Introducing resources and engaging with stakeholders in a contested and fractured environment such as Libya is an inherently political process; it will create winners and losers, and change relationships and power dynamics within and between groups. These impacts may be positive or negative; direct or indirect; intentional or unintentional (see Box 1). Acting with conflict sensitivity is not only a responsibility, it also reduces risk to the intervention and makes international assistance more effective.

### Box 1: Impact of a rehabilitation project on tensions in Ubari, Libya – 2017

In 2017 a Social Peace Partnership (SPP) that was set up by PCi received word that angry youth had stopped work at the construction site of an international rehabilitation project. When the SPP members investigated, they found that the young people in question were Tebu and had associations with the 'Youth Coalition', a group of Tebu fighters that fought in the 2014 conflict between the Tebu and Tuareg in Ubari. Tensions between the Tuareg and Tebu had persisted, and the Tebu youth were expressing anger about perceived unfairness in the procurement and decision-making processes of the construction project. They felt that Tebu had been disadvantaged in the contracting process and that Tuareg contractors were disproportionately hired. The perceived unfairness resulted in increased tensions and delayed the rehabilitation works whilst the issue was being resolved.

Being conflict sensitive is a deliberate and systematic approach that involves **three core Steps** applied at the design phase of an intervention and then at regular intervals during implementation, particularly if there is a shift in the context. The Steps are outlined in the table below, with in-depth guidance provided in Section 2.

**Fig 1: Three-Steps Framework for conflict sensitivity**

What	How
1. <b>Understand the peace and conflict context</b> by drawing on analysis.	Undertake a <b>conflict analysis</b> (relevant to the area you are working in), update it regularly and monitor the conflict context.
2. <b>Understand the interactions</b> between the intervention and the peace and conflict context.	<b>Review and monitor</b> activities for potential negative and positive conflict sensitivity interactions.
3. <b>Act on</b> this understanding to minimise negative effects (risks) and maximise positive impacts on peace and conflict (opportunities).	<b>Adapt or adjust</b> interventions to mitigate and respond to risks and to leverage opportunities.

To be effective, conflict sensitivity also necessitates changes in behaviour and institutional ways of working. It requires senior-level buy-in and integration within systems and processes across a range of functions such as human resources, finance, procurement, funding, communications (internal and external) and coordination.

### 1.3 Conflict sensitivity and gender

Gender roles, identities, relationships and related power structures both reinforce conflict drivers and create opportunities to promote peace in Libya. Conflict sensitivity necessitates understanding how assistance interacts with the different roles men and women play in conflict. This is to avoid inadvertently reinforcing the gender inequalities and norms that underpin conflict and instead seek to positively influence gender dynamics in a way that bolsters the potential for peace.

Women are adversely affected by instability and insecurity in Libya. A lack of equal participation in the transitional and peace processes, state institutions, security sector or society more generally has meant that women are less able to voice their concerns, play a positive role and ensure their needs are addressed. There are no laws for the prevention of domestic abuse and harassment and only weak legislation regarding sexual violence. At a local level, women play varied roles in peacebuilding, at times promoting peace (for example, by putting pressure on communities to resolve disputes or by acting as a point of contact between disputants) whilst, at other times,

acting to reinforce conflict – there are reports of women encouraging men to take up arms and refusing to accept agreements set by community leaders.

Instability has also impacted on men's roles, identities and wellbeing. Many young men who took up arms during the revolution have subsequently been drawn into militias as a livelihood option. This process has reinforced violent and aggressive notions of masculinity, undermined mental health and unbalanced the power and status of young men vis-à-vis their elders – all of which pose conflict risks.

Gender sensitivity needs to be part of conflict sensitive practice in the following ways:

- Analysis, monitoring and local feedback mechanisms need to include the differential perspectives of women, girls, men and boys and seek to understand the influence of gender dynamics on conflict (and vice versa).
- There needs to be reflection on how activities will influence gender roles, relations and gender norms, particularly as they relate to peace and conflict dynamics.

#### 1.4 Conflict sensitivity trade-offs in Libya

In Libya, the complex environment means there are often situations where there is no clear solution for managing conflict sensitivity risks. Acting with conflict sensitivity can mean being confronted with some difficult trade-offs; for example, a situation where all possible approaches (even stopping assistance) may have negative effects, or where there are trade-offs between benefits and harms or even different sets of objectives e.g. long-term vs. short-term benefits (see Box 2).

##### Box 2: Examples of trade-offs confronted by assistance providers in Libya


- **Engaging with national actors.** International assistance delivered through national governance structures may confer a sense of legitimacy to, and empower, those institutions. When governance structures are contested, as they were between rival national authorities the GNA in the West and the Haftar-affiliated government in the East between 2016 and 2020, decisions by international assistance providers about which national institutions to engage with can foster perceptions of international bias towards one side of the conflict, and strengthen senses of marginalisation or exclusion among those who support alternative authorities. On the other hand, bypassing national institutions risked undermining institutional capacities necessary for sustained development and undermining the confidence in national institutions by local authorities and communities, while adopting a more open policy towards authorities in the East and under control of the Haftar-affiliated LNA risked providing credibility to non-democratic and violent approaches.
- **Relationships with armed groups.** It may be impossible to deliver assistance in some areas without armed groups deriving some material benefit, directly or indirectly, and without strengthening their role in society and politics. Armed groups have been known to demand protection fees or have associations with local partners, businesses and government actors, and assistance can be stolen or diverted by armed actors. However, not delivering assistance means that needs remain unmet, and can have negative repercussions on other drivers of conflict.
- **Short-term vs. long-term engagement.** Changes in the operating environment, such as an upswing in violence or a natural disaster, may lead to an increase in immediate short-term humanitarian needs. This may have the effect of deprioritising longer-term programming that is essential to promote medium- or long-term stability and peace, such as interventions focused on countering divisive narratives, promoting social cohesion and inclusive development.

Navigating conflict sensitivity trade-offs will generally require understanding and balancing the benefits and risks associated with different courses of action (including stopping assistance). In many cases this means considering the trade-offs between short-term demands and longer-term goals or different commitments. It also requires thinking through creative approaches to managing risks where they exist, carefully monitoring the impacts and risks associated with the chosen course of action and keeping decisions under constant review. Being conflict sensitive means doing this in a systematic and transparent manner.

### 1.5 Conflict sensitivity at different levels

Conflict sensitive engagement in Libya needs to operate at several levels to be effective – as highlighted in the following diagram:

**Fig 2: Conflict sensitivity at different levels**



**Policy level:** Most donors and organisations operating in Libya will have global policies promoting conflict sensitivity, often accompanied by guidance and some advisory capacity. Nonetheless, decisions or actions taken at a senior level can sometimes run counter to conflict sensitivity (e.g. donor government foreign policy positions or communications). Staff should familiarise themselves with their organisation’s commitments, draw on the resources available and, if necessary, remind decision makers about the relevant policy commitments on conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’.

**Strategic level:** Considering conflict sensitivity when designing intervention strategies is essential if interventions informed by those strategies are to be conflict sensitive. Strategies may include

agencies' individual country strategies or strategies governing the use of certain funds, such as the EUTF. It is often at this level that major conflict sensitivity trade-offs need to be thrashed out (e.g. balancing immediate and longer-term goals and different types of support).

**Project and programme level:** Conflict sensitivity practice should be integrated across the programme cycle: from preparation and design through to implementation, monitoring and evaluation – as illustrated in Figure 3 (see Section 2).

**Coordination and collective approaches:** Being conflict sensitive will often necessitate a concerted international response (both at a national and local level) if one set of actors is not to undermine efforts to be conflict sensitive of another (e.g. when engaging with different authorities, or responding to the risks to the formal economy of engaging with the black market). Coordination structures and discussion fora therefore have an important role to play. In Libya, discussions are aided by the existence of a Conflict Sensitive Assistance in Libya (CSA) Forum<sup>1</sup> which aims to support the ability of international assistance providers working in and on Libya to undertake their work in a conflict-sensitive manner (see Box 3).

### **Box 3: Conflict sensitivity and collective action**

In 2016, actors associated with the Haftar-affiliated LNA started appointing military mayors in municipalities, thus undermining democratic processes. Following discussion at a CSA Forum meeting on the conflict sensitivity risks associated with these actions and the importance of collective action, donors took a common position on refusing to engage with militarily appointed actors and only working with those that were democratically elected.

This system-wide approach and aligned communication is particularly important in Libya where decisions made at a strategic level – individually or collectively (e.g. who and where to engage) – can impact on conflict sensitivity at the programme and operational level.

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The CSA Forum is funded by the Government of Switzerland and the European Union and facilitated by the Peaceful Change initiative.


## Section 2: Integrating conflict sensitivity in practice

This section provides detailed guidance on applying the three Steps of conflict sensitivity across projects and programmes.

### 2.1 The three key Steps of a conflict sensitive approach

The three Steps of conflict sensitivity (see Fig 1) should be undertaken when designing assistance and then revisited at regular intervals during implementation, particularly when there is a sudden and/or significant change in the context. Even where conflict analysis and conflict sensitive practice has not explicitly informed programme design, it is not too late to apply the three Steps, so long as there is room for some adaptation in programming to manage and respond to any risks.

**Fig 3: Conflict sensitivity and the programme cycle**



#### Step 1: Understanding the peace and conflict context

The first foundational step ensures an adequate understanding of the peace and conflict context through undertaking a conflict analysis, updating it regularly and developing methods to monitor the evolving context on an ongoing basis. Analysis can be done as a stand-alone exercise or as part of an existing analysis process (e.g. a political economy analysis or needs assessment).

A conflict analysis includes an assessment of:

- **The profile or history of peace and conflict** – a brief overview of the key information about the area and its experience of conflict; for example: history, demographics, identity groups, gender dynamics, economic and social factors, local governance and security, relations with neighbours.
- **The main factors affecting peace and conflict** – the factors that drive conflict by causing divisions, grievances and/or violence, or that contribute to prospects for peace. It can be helpful to break these down into social, economic, political/governance and security-related factors, and also to differentiate between structural (longer-term) factors (e.g. economic inequalities, social exclusion, the structure of the political economy or the role of the formal

and illicit economy) versus more recent factors that are aggravating or improving the situation (e.g. an influx of arms, militia formation, organised criminal activity relating to migration or peace initiatives, etc). It is important to understand how these factors relate to each other, whether there are linkages between conflict at different levels (local, regional and national level and international dimensions) and how they may play out for men and women, and for people of different ages and backgrounds.

- **Why?** Interventions will almost always impact on peace and conflict factors (positively or negatively) in ways that are intended or unintended. Therefore, these factors need to be identified in order to understand how interventions interact with them and manage the impact of that interaction.
- **The main actors in the conflict context and the relationships between them.** Actors may include governance actors, security or armed groups, businesses, or social and communal groups. The assessment should highlight their relationships to other actors, and their needs, interests, and capacities for achieving them.
  - **Why?** Interventions will often empower or disempower certain actors, and affect their relationships, with resulting impacts on the conflict context. Key actors therefore need to be understood so that impacts and relationships can be managed to deliver assistance in a conflict-sensitive manner.
- **Conflict systems and conflict dynamics.** The interrelationships between different peace and conflict factors will often produce a conflict system (or a number of different, related systems) which is influenced, steered or interrupted by different actors or events. It can be helpful to map these systems visually. Dynamics represent the key threats or opportunities in that system that could worsen or improve peace and conflict.
  - **Why?** Interventions will impact on conflict systems and dynamics. They therefore need to be understood in order to prepare for different potential scenarios and to ensure interventions seek to promote positive dynamics whilst reducing negative ones.

### **Identifying the focus and depth of analysis**

Conflict analysis aims to help decision makers better understand the environment into which they are intervening. The depth and focus should therefore be informed by the type and location(s) of the activities and the decisions it will inform. For example, an analysis to inform the conflict sensitivity of activities aimed at improving the socioeconomic conditions of migrants, refugees and host communities in target municipalities should allow for a detailed understanding of the conflict context at the level of the municipality. It should pay attention to conflict issues relating to socio-economic conditions and the presence of and movement of migrants and refugees, and situate the local conflict within the broader regional and national conflict systems.

#### Box 4: Top tips for Step 1: conducting peace and conflict analysis

- **Draw on existing available up-to-date analysis** where it exists (but do assess for a robust methodology, quality and relevance).
- **Share analysis with other organisations or undertake joint analysis** where possible. This reduces the burden of primary research for communities and the likelihood of 'analysis fatigue'. It is more efficient and cost-effective, and can help forge a consensus around the key issues and inform concerted efforts.
- **Make the analysis process as participatory as possible.** Engage those involved in implementing and making decisions around the programme in the analysis process to ensure uptake of findings and relevance. Short, facilitated conflict analysis workshops are a good way of doing this.
- **Gain a sound understanding of the longer-term or structural conflict factors** and systems in the areas where you are working (examples of factors might be social and economic marginalisation of certain groups, entrenchment of armed groups, weak rule of law etc). These will form the foundation of the analysis onto which local nuance and more recent events and dynamics can be mapped. For example, in Libya the power, reach and political alliances of armed groups shift according to time and place; however, the underpinning structural conflict factor of entrenchment of armed groups in state and society persists.
- **Make sure analysis processes are adequately resourced** with time and money allocated for it within management plans and budgets. Good analysis takes time, although updating it is more straightforward.
- **Keep the analysis updated.** A written analysis could be updated bi-annually, but in the meantime find creative and informal ways of refreshing understanding of the evolving context where the programme is delivered. Get staff (including Libyan staff) to prepare short presentations of situational updates for meetings. Ensure someone from your organisation (including Libyan staff) attends events where contextual issues and developments are discussed (e.g. the CSA Forum) and feeds back any key insights to the broader team. Bring in Libyan experts to deliver 'brown bag lunches', sharing the findings with those who are unable to attend.
- **Don't forget to include the role of international actors in the analysis.** This is a common oversight but essential to understanding the role of externals as part of the conflict system and dynamics.

#### *Step 2: Understanding how assistance interacts with peace and conflict*

Step 2 identifies potential interactions between the intervention and the conflict context. The objective is to unearth any risks of negative impacts and any opportunities to contribute to peace, by analysing how the intervention's activities (i.e. the 'what, where, when and how' of the support being delivered, and who is being engaged) relate to the understanding of the context developed during Step 1. This is sometimes referred to as a conflict sensitivity review or conflict sensitivity assessment.

Some organisations include Steps 2 (identifying interactions) and 3 (adaptations) as part of the conflict analysis process itself. However, it can be a stand-alone exercise following the analysis in the form of a facilitated workshop, meeting or a short study, or even integrated within risk assessment processes. There is no single right format, but important decisions will need to be made about the programme, so it is important that all key people are engaged in the process.

Each step should be undertaken alongside the design of new assistance and revisited when analyses are updated, when significant changes occur in the conflict, or there is evidence of increased tension. They should therefore become part of the programme's ongoing monitoring, adaptation and risk management function.

Step 2 revolves around two guiding questions:

- How does the peace and conflict context affect assistance activities?
- How do assistance activities affect the peace and conflict context?

*How does the peace and conflict context affect assistance activities?*

This first question aims to consider how conflict may affect the ability to implement activities. Being conflict sensitive requires a nuanced understanding of what is relevant and achievable in the conflict context, to ensure that expectations are realistic, and activities remain effective. The following box highlights some typical impacts of conflict on interventions in Libya that are important to track.

#### **Box 5: Typical impacts of conflict on interventions in Libya**

- **Changing assistance priorities.** In Libya the conflict context is volatile, and periodic spikes in open conflict and violence are common. This affects the relevance, appropriateness and timeliness of planned or ongoing activities. For example, where there is violent contestation of control of local governance, it will become very difficult to implement programmes designed to be delivered in conjunction with Libyan municipal authorities. At the same time, pressing humanitarian needs are likely to emerge.
- **Security risks.** Staff, partners and assets are exposed to increased security threats. Travel and engagement with interlocutors and beneficiaries is challenging and raises the cost of delivering assistance.
- **Access challenges.** Political and armed actors may limit access to certain locations, or insist on accompanying assistance providers, due to sensitivities.
- **Financial risks.** In Libya, the cost of goods and services may experience greater volatility as the exchange rate fluctuates and losses are incurred due to corruption and theft. Payment through the formal banking system is difficult, with challenges around liquidity and corruption.
- **Sustainability.** The sustainability of assistance can be affected by the violent destruction of assets, changing counterparts and partners, or policy uncertainty.
- **Due diligence and compliance.** The prevalence of conflict actors, the emergence of a conflict economy and difficulties in finding information increase the difficulties in undertaking due diligence of counterparts, partners and beneficiaries.

Organisations working in Libya have generally already established mechanisms and risk management processes for identifying the way conflict affects programming. Being conflict sensitive necessitates reviewing these regularly and as the context changes. Key questions to ask are:

- Have any developments in the conflict made parts of the intervention inappropriate (or even potentially harmful) in the current context? Are underlying assumptions still valid?
- Is delivering assistance still possible? Can it realistically have an impact?
- What new priorities are emerging?

Where programming either becomes irrelevant or very difficult to deliver, it is important to recognise that there may also be conflict sensitivity risks associated with stopping activities. For example, ceasing support to groups or actors may reinforce their grievances or spark new ones. Such risks must be managed; for example, by ensuring clear communication with local stakeholders and beneficiaries on why activities have ceased, or by considering alternative implementation methods.

*How do assistance activities affect peace and conflict?*

The second guiding question, which **should form the focus of attention** during Step 2, examines how assistance activities may affect the peace and conflict context assessed in Step 1.

Assistance activities tend to influence peace and conflict in two ways: by *influencing factors* that drive or reduce conflict – such as perceptions of marginalisation or exclusion, or the conflict economy; and by *affecting stakeholders* – for example, by empowering or disempowering actors, providing recognition, status or legitimacy to actors, changing relationships between groups, or endangering partners. Together, these impacts will influence conflict systems and dynamics.

Impacts may be:

- *positive or negative*. Activities could contribute to sustainable peace or they could worsen conflict drivers and exacerbate tensions.
- *direct or indirect*. Factors and stakeholders may be affected directly through engagement, or indirectly, as a side effect of activities.
- *intentional or unintentional*. The impact of activities on peace and conflict could be foreseen and intended by decision makers, or be accidental and unforeseen.

Impacts of assistance on the peace and conflict context can be categorised into different types of effects, as highlighted in the following table of examples from the Libyan context.

**Table 1: Types of peace and conflict interactions**

Interaction type	Description	Example impacts on conflict factors and stakeholders in Libya
<b>Distribution effect</b>	<p>Assistance is distributed (or perceived to be distributed) differently in accordance with existing social, political or economic divisions or tensions.</p> <p>Assistance can extend not just to direct beneficiaries but also to who is being employed, receiving contracts, supporting logistics etc.</p> <p>Distribution effects can alternatively reduce tensions between groups when assistance is delivered across existing tensions or divisions in a collaborative manner.</p>	<p>In Libya, perceptions of unequal access to project benefits have reinforced resentments between different ethnic groups in communities – e.g. in Kufra and Ubari – or between host and migrant communities.</p> <p>Nationally, perceptions of unequal distribution of international support between the East and West has reinforced existing perceptions of marginalisation and political polarisation.</p> <p>However, there are also positive examples of organisations bringing together different actors or municipal councils in decision-making processes and supporting inclusive processes. This has led to more equitable distribution of resources and decreased mistrust and increased cooperation between groups.</p>

<p><b>Recognition/ Legitimation effect</b></p>	<p>Working with, through or alongside actors can give status, recognition and perceived legitimacy to those actors and reinforce unaccountable or non-transparent processes.</p> <p>Conversely, working with actors based on the degree to which they operate in accordance with defined political, administrative and legal processes, and in accordance with principles such as inclusion and transparency (and supporting them to do so) can strengthen the idea of peaceful political processes and the rule of law and could support those who might not otherwise have a voice.</p>	<p>There are powerful individuals within local and national government institutions who may attempt to increase the visibility of their engagement with international actors to bolster their perceived legitimacy vis-à-vis others or may attempt to steer programme benefits towards their interests and support base to pursue personal objectives.</p> <p>Providing support to certain detention centres risks conferring legitimacy on the actors running them, many of which are, or have links to, armed groups.</p>
<p><b>Economic market effect</b></p>	<p>Assistance may affect economic markets by changing economic fundamentals, affecting supply streams, creating new markets or undermining existing ones.</p> <p>Positively, assistance may build economic supply chains across conflict lines, encouraging positive economic interdependency.</p>	<p>Assistance may overwhelm local markets with goods, such as food aid, undermining the viability of licit economic activity and encouraging actors to engage in illicit activities which may be linked to conflict.</p> <p>Negative market effects may strengthen those conflict actors who are able to control illicit economic activities or the benefits of corruption.</p>
<p><b>Capacity effect</b></p>	<p>The way assistance is delivered may negatively or positively affect how state and non-state structures and institutions function.</p>	<p>Shifts in assistance from national to local governance institutions (especially when uncoordinated) risks contributing to Libya's fragmentation and can worsen relations between national and local government (if not delivered in line with decentralisation frameworks).</p> <p>Positively, where international actors adopt a coordinated approach, contextualised within Libya's governance framework, this may provide an opportunity to bring local and national actors closer together.</p>

<b>Theft/ diversion</b>	Actors on the ground may steal or redirect assistance for resale, distribution to their own constituencies or to pursue their own interests.	Libyan armed groups are known to demand protection money from businesses, local and international partners and government actors. Some seek to divert resources at checkpoints or steal resources.  International assistance may therefore provide material benefit to armed groups and strengthen their role in society and politics.
<b>Modelling behaviour</b>	Stakeholders may see the way international assistance providers behave as a model for how to act themselves.  Assistance can be delivered in a way that encourages inclusive and consultative practices.	When the international community shows that it is acceptable to pursue short-term national interests over more sustainable long-term solutions, it implies to Libyan counterparts that such approaches are acceptable.  Conversely, the use of participatory processes, following defined procedures, may strengthen the use of such approaches as conflict management mechanisms and in governance.
<b>Attention effect</b>	Attention on a particular issue, event or dynamic – such as media focus, communication, diplomatic pressure or the work of activists – may change the ways stakeholders behave.	Attention on an issue, such as economic inequality, and its relationship to peace and conflict, may increase commitment to addressing it as a structural factor among donors, international and national actors and the public.  International attention on human rights may discourage actors on the ground from engaging in human rights abuses or violations. A lack of attention may provide a sense of impunity.

<b>Prioritisation effect</b>	<p>The prioritisation choices of national government, donors and assistance providers can increase or decrease capacities to reduce conflict and promote peace, and affect trust.</p>	<p>Prioritisation of activities aimed at addressing one or several peace and conflict factors may lead to significant resources being available to address it.</p> <p>Shifting donor priorities in response to a crisis, such as away from longer-term projects towards immediate humanitarian response, may mean that key issues affecting peace and conflict may no longer be addressed, with consequences for sustainable peace after the crisis is over.</p> <p>Partners may lose trust in assistance providers if they perceive that activities are self-interested or focus on the interests of donors rather than the needs perceived by the community.</p> <p>Partners may lose trust in the commitment of assistance providers if activities are suddenly shifted or changed.</p>
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Considering the potential impact of activities on the peace and conflict context involves drawing on the peace and conflict analysis to answer the following questions:

- Which *peace and conflict factors*, identified in the analysis, might the assistance affect and how?
- Which *stakeholders* might be affected by the assistance? Will they benefit or lose out? How? Will the assistance alter the balance or quality of *relationships between stakeholders*?
- What *conflict dynamics or systems* might the assistance influence?

The review could alternatively be structured around the following sets of questions:

- **Who** the programme engages with and targets for support locally, nationally and internationally. For example, who will benefit and who will lose out (financially and in terms of recognition)? How will this affect conflict factors, stakeholder relationships and the ways in which the organisation and staff are perceived?
- **Where** efforts are focused geographically and institutionally. For example, are they focused on certain areas or institutions? Could this be experienced or perceived in certain ways that reinforce conflict or peace factors? On whose territory is operating infrastructure located? How might that affect conflict factors and stakeholders?
- **How** the programme delivers activities. For example, how do partners relate to the conflict? Do they reflect one group of stakeholders? How is the project communicating about what it does? How does this affect the position of local stakeholders and how the organisation is perceived? How does the project consider the perspectives of beneficiaries in decision making?
- **When** the programme delivers activities. Does the timing coincide with any events or shifts in the conflict context? For example, has control of an area recently changed hands or does the timing coincide with an election? How might this affect or influence the position of stakeholders or feed into the dynamics of conflict factors?
- **What** the programme is delivering. For example, how might the type of support delivered affect the conflict? Is the programme designed to address conflict issues? If not, what more could be done to reinforce peace factors or support peace actors?

The answers to these questions will help identify potential negative interactions, or risks that assistance may do harm to the conflict context; and potential positive interactions, or opportunities for activities to contribute to promoting or reinforcing peace.

Identifying opportunities can be more challenging than identifying risks. It is relatively easy to identify problems compared with finding solutions, and the costs of doing harm are easier to grasp

than the opportunity costs of missed positive contributions. It is therefore important that enough attention is focused on this aspect of the review.

There is no one 'right way' to structure the review process in Step 2. You should adopt an approach that makes sense to the programme and organisational context. Remember, however, that going through this process involves thinking about programme and risk quite differently than many are used to, which can be challenging at first. Getting support from those with expertise in conflict sensitivity to facilitate discussions may be necessary and helpful. Many organisations find it helpful to capture the findings of Steps 2 and 3 in a Conflict Sensitivity Interactions Matrix (see example matrix at Annex A, and Table 3).

### Operations, administration and resources management

Organisations can impact on the peace and conflict context as much through the ways in which they operate and manage their resources as through the programming approaches they adopt. The table below highlights some areas in which donors and implementing partners working in Libya may struggle to be conflict sensitive in their operations, and some further questions that can help identify related impacts.

**Table 2: Considering the impact of resources management on peace and conflict**

Area	Questions to consider
<b>Procurement</b>	<p>Who benefits economically from your procurement? Are they associated or affiliated with one group or another, or do they tend to employ mostly from certain groups? Are they (indirectly) political actors or potentially engaged in the illicit economy? How does this impact on the capacities and interests of those engaged in the conflict context (positively and negatively)?</p> <p><b>Example:</b> Hiring contractors who only employ staff from one ethnic group could create perceptions of bias, reinforcing tensions and potentially leading to violence (see Ubari case study in Box 1).</p>
<b>Human resources and staffing</b>	<p>Do staff have the profile and capacities to behave in a conflict-sensitive manner? Do they (including international and Libyan staff) have the skills to understand the conflict and their relationship to it and to engage sensitively with a range of stakeholders in a contested political environment? Do Libyan staff represent the diversity of opinions and backgrounds within Libya?</p> <p><b>Example:</b> Staff working in Libya will come from a variety of backgrounds (including non-development backgrounds) and many will have been personally affected by the conflict and events leading up to it. This will impact on how they understand and interpret the context and how they view people they engage with. It is important to recognise this dynamic at play and to support staff to ensure they have the skills and understanding necessary to navigate these issues.</p>

<b>Logistics and delivery</b>	<p>On whose social territory is operating infrastructure located: e.g. use of hotels, offices, warehousing etc? By which means is assistance distributed? Who is involved? Who is benefiting and how might that be perceived?</p> <p><b>Example:</b> In divided communities in Libya, the location of operating infrastructure may send a signal of support or preference to certain groups which can increase discontent. At the same time, militia and political actors will often have a stake in, or some control over, local businesses providing services to assistance providers. It is important to be aware of such issues when making decisions relating to logistics.</p>
<b>Finance and legal</b>	<p>Is finance highly earmarked? Does that make adjusting activities in response to contextual changes difficult? How is money transferred to local partners? Could this encourage use of the black market?</p> <p><b>Example:</b> Finance can create an enabling or constraining environment for operating with conflict sensitivity: e.g. heavy earmarking reduces the possibility of adaptive programming to respond to contextual changes.</p>
<b>Communications</b>	<p>How is the organisation communicating about their assistance to local communities? Are the communications clear and sensitive? How might communications from donors impact the position of partners within local communities? Do communications intentionally or unintentionally convey a sense of bias towards particular conflict groups? Are communications plans in place to respond to conflict sensitivity risks when they occur?</p> <p><b>Example:</b> Local actors in Libya will sometimes claim and receive credit for the activities of international actors (e.g. building new schools or hospitals). If the criteria and process for delivering assistance are not clearly communicated, the assistance risks being 'captured' for the political benefit of certain groups or individuals.</p>

*Step 3: Making adaptations. Managing conflict sensitivity risks and trade-offs and leveraging opportunities to contribute to peace*

Step 3 identifies approaches to responding to the conflict sensitivity risks, opportunities and issues identified in Step 2. Mitigating conflict sensitivity risks or maximising opportunities does not always require significant changes to activities. Even subtle adaptations in terms of process, communications or the stakeholders engaged can make a big difference. Much of the effort is in getting the analysis and diagnosis of issues right, so it is worth giving Steps 1 and 2 of the process enough time and focus.

Examples of adjustments to enhance the conflict sensitivity of programmes in Libya include:

- **Enhancing communications, stakeholder dialogue and relations** with and between local counterparts, other agencies and local beneficiaries. For example, some organisations working in Libya have engaged with Social Peace Partnerships to support consultations with

local communities and municipalities to ensure representation of, and a voice for, diverse constituencies such as women and youth. These consultations have helped to identify priorities in a participatory manner, to mitigate any tensions and to respond to these as they arise; and they have provided opportunities to contribute to social peace, including through improving relationships between stakeholders.

- **Adjusting the balance, sequencing and delivery of support across different locations.** Organisations engaging in Libya have actively considered how they can balance and sequence support across locations in order to manage conflict sensitivity risks associated with perceptions around resource distribution (particularly between the East and West of the country) and increase the potential for building cooperation between municipalities. This has been accompanied by clear communication within and through programme steering committees and with local counterparts (at a national and local level) on the process and decision-making criteria.
- **Adjusting programmes to enable access by different communities.** Organisations engaging in areas where communities and municipal government are divided have adjusted the location and mechanisms for accessing support, in order to ensure equitable access to services by different groups and engagement by multiple governance partners, using clear communications to manage perceptions and tensions as they have arisen.
- **Modelling behaviour.** The way assistance providers act can have an influence on partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. It is important to ensure that assistance is delivered in a way that strengthens principles of trust, inclusivity, due process and the rule of law. This means that assistance should be inclusive, consultative, transparent, clearly communicated and based on clear processes and criteria for beneficiary selection.
- **Introducing principles to guide decision making on programming.** Some programmes in Libya have introduced principles within the programme governance structure to help ensure that decision making by multiple stakeholders (national and international) is conflict sensitive.

**Table 3: Examples of risks and adjustments in a Conflict Sensitivity Matrix**

Interaction (risk or opportunity)	Possible mitigation/response
<p><b>Reconstruction project:</b> The Municipal Council in the area where the project is being implemented is dominated by one tribe. This has the potential to increase concern amongst other tribes/groups around the (in)equitable division of project benefits. This could lead to increased divisions and tensions between the council and communities and between the communities themselves – with potential for violent backlash.</p>	<p>Include broad representation from different communities and groups (gender/ethnicity/age/political affiliation) in determining reconstruction needs and in monitoring implementation, in consultation with the Municipal Council. Set up a consultative dialogue mechanism e.g. via Social Peace Partnerships.</p>
<p><b>Women's economic empowerment/livelihoods project:</b> Addressing gender inequality and women's empowerment is critical for long-term prospects for stability in Libya. However, there are risks that it will lead to a backlash and increased resistance to women's participation.</p>	<p>Ensure understanding of the relationship between gender dynamics and conflict dynamics in the location.</p> <p>Start with pilot projects which are carefully monitored, and scale up where successful.</p> <p>Consult with a wide range of stakeholders, including community leaders, around the project's objectives.</p>

More information on typical conflict sensitivity risks, trade-offs and opportunities in Libya and conflict sensitivity considerations in relation to communications, support to local governance and the international response to COVID-19 can be found in the papers referenced in the Resources section.

## Managing trade-offs

It may become clear, after going through Steps 2 and 3, that any course of action may produce a negative effect, in which case a structured, explicit and informed approach to managing trade-offs should be adopted.

Managing trade-offs can be broken down into a five-step process:

**Table 4: Five-step process for managing conflict sensitivity trade-offs**

	Step description	Example
1.	<b>Describe the trade-off</b> clearly, including the positive and negative effects	Material assistance is provided to a municipality in order to promote stabilisation and reconstruction (positive effects). However, the contractors carrying materials are subjected to militia checkpoints where payments are demanded (negative effect). We are unable to provide assistance without providing material benefit to a key actor in the conflict. Stopping assistance will also have a negative effect in terms of impact on employment and community perceptions of assistance providers (trade-off).
2.	<b>Consider the different options</b> or courses of action, including creative solutions	Option A: Continue the support. Accept and monitor the negative effect. Try to minimise payments through engaging with local stakeholders who have contacts to militias.  Option B: Stop the support. Communicate clearly to local stakeholders why support is being stopped. Accept and monitor the negative effect.
3.	<b>Explore the evidence</b>	Look into and include known evidence around negative and positive effects of Option A and B.
4.	<b>Decide a course of action</b> and document the decision-making process	Project A accepts that there is a risk of providing some material benefit to armed groups through payments at militia checkpoints. However, having looked at the evidence around the different courses of action, we have decided to continue, but to mitigate the negative effect by a) monitoring the negative impacts – i.e. incidents of payment; and b) reducing payments through engagement with local stakeholders who have access to armed groups.
5.	<b>Monitor</b> for harms and benefits <b>and revisit the options regularly</b>	Monitor the incidents of payments to militias through a payments log and the harm that it may cause to the conflict context. On that basis, revisit the decision on a monthly basis, or if there is evidence of a significant increase in payments or increase in negative impact.

When it comes to conflict sensitivity trade-offs, there is a temptation to ignore or downplay them or to just 'muddle through'. However, explicitly acknowledging trade-offs as they arise and working through them in a structured and open way improves the quality of decision making, tends to generate more creative thinking around managing trade-offs, and can help staff and organisations justify the reasons for adopting particular approaches, which can help strengthen learning and accountability and manage reputational risks down the line.

#### Box 6: Top tips for Steps 2 and 3: conflict sensitivity review and adaptation

- **Capture identified risks, opportunities and responses in a Conflict Sensitivity Matrix** or log, attach this to programme documentation and include major risks within the programme's risk register. An template Conflict Sensitivity Interactions Matrix can be found at Annex A.
- **Draw on conflict sensitivity expertise and facilitation** where available. Many organisations have sources of expertise on conflict sensitivity, such as conflict advisers and organisational guidance. In Libya, organisations such as Peaceful Change initiative provide tailored support and facilitation on conflict sensitivity through the Conflict Sensitive Assistance (CSA) process. Expertise from outside the programme can be very helpful, not just for technical and facilitation skills but also to enable a fresh-perspective and challenge function.
- **Name all risks and responses, even ones that are already built into programming or seem obvious**, such as risks of creating tensions around distribution of project benefits. This ensures that what may seem obvious to those who know the context well is described to everyone and provides a reference point for monitoring risks if the context shifts.
- **Name all risks and responses, even ones that may not seem immediately possible to manage at the level of the intervention.** Some risks are influenced by higher strategic-level issues or actions. For example, in Libya implementing agencies can find themselves associated with the political positions of donors or other parts of an organisation, potentially creating risks of backlash against local staff (for example, other UN agencies may be associated with the more sensitive and contentious political work carried out by UNSMIL). It is still, however, important to identify such risks, understand the harms they may cause and identify ways to minimise that harm. This can also help advocacy towards strategic decision makers.
- **Consider identifying risks and responses together with others working in the same space** through coordinated action. Conflict sensitivity can be undermined when assistance providers adopt different, overlapping, or contradictory approaches and sometimes it will not be possible to deal with risks in one project or intervention alone. Coordinated and concerted action can strengthen conflict sensitivity.
- **Further interrogate all responses to identified risks for potential new risks.** Responding to one risk may create a new risk which then needs to be considered and managed. For example, stopping assistance in response to a risk may change power relations in a way that, in turn, risks doing harm to the conflict context. **Don't make 'perfect' the enemy of doing anything at all.** Many organisations make the mistake of trying to design the perfect conflict sensitivity process, which can seem overwhelming, and experience continuous delays or get stuck in the process. Design a realistic process on the basis that doing something is better than nothing. Small measures like bringing a few colleagues together to reflect on the context and potential risks and opportunities can go a long way.

## 2.2 Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity is an ongoing process that involves continually tracking changes in the conflict context and monitoring for anticipated and unanticipated interactions (both risks and opportunities).

This entails:

**Monitoring changes in the context** by keeping the analysis up to date. In Libya, some long-term peace and conflict factors remain reasonably steady (e.g. structure of the political economy); however, some dynamics and relationships between different actors constantly shift, and new conflict risks or opportunities arise. It is therefore important to regularly refresh the analysis in a light-touch way – for example, by ensuring that contextual updates are included within programme

reporting (verbal and written). It can also be helpful to identify indicators (with related data sources) to track key elements of the peace and conflict context and show whether the situation is shifting over time (see Box 7).

**Monitoring interactions.** Monitoring risks and opportunities, including those identified up-front as part of the conflict sensitivity review, should become part of programme reporting mechanisms. This can be encouraged by adding a line for reporting on conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities within reporting templates, ensuring regular exchanges and feedback from local staff and implementing partners and/or using a Conflict Sensitivity Interactions Tracker which captures emerging conflict sensitivity issues within a programme (see Box 7 and Annex B). Formal tracking of conflict sensitivity interaction indicators can be helpful (see Box 7).

Indicators will not, however, provide data on *unanticipated* conflict interactions (as by nature they are created a priori). This requires more open-ended enquiry through beneficiary and non-beneficiary feedback and local accountability mechanisms. It can be hard to achieve in the volatile Libyan context, but there are tools worth exploring such as perception surveys, social media monitoring and protection helplines (see Box 7).

Approaches to monitoring risks and opportunities can be included in a programme's Conflict Sensitivity Matrix (see Table 5 below) and can also be integrated and reviewed within a programme's overall risk management matrix.

**Monitoring conflict sensitivity processes.** Programmes and organisations should actively monitor how well they (and their implementing partners) are integrating the measures necessary for conflict sensitivity into their processes and activities. This can be done by setting standards and monitoring these through a 'marker' or audit (see Box 7). Mid-term reviews are also a good time to take stock of whether conflict sensitivity is being applied.

### Box 7: Monitoring tools for conflict sensitivity

- **Context indicators** can help to provide information that tracks how the peace and conflict context is shifting over time. They may take the form of proxy indicators for the overall level of conflict, e.g. casualty rates, or the number of security incidents. Alternatively, they can track conflict factors which have been identified as relevant for the intervention. For example, in contexts where migrant–host community relations are a key factor influencing peace and conflict, an indicator for this factor might be the percentage of community members reporting favourable attitudes towards migrant populations, with data captured through a survey.
- **Interaction indicators** can help track the existence of risks or opportunities identified in the conflict sensitivity review. For example, if the programme wishes to monitor whether it is (inadvertently) reinforcing divisions and tensions due to perceptions of (or actual) unequal access to project benefits, an indicator might be the number and description of incidents of violence or disagreement relating to the programme through local staff reports, implementing partner monitoring, local surveys etc.
- **Perception surveys, social media monitoring, complaints mechanisms and focus groups** are all useful tools for identifying unanticipated interactions. Some organisations working in Libya have funded local perception surveys and used local peacebuilding mechanisms such as Social Peace Partnerships to keep abreast of local perspectives on the impacts of their activities on the conflict context. It may be possible to add conflict sensitivity-related questions to existing surveys. Social media monitoring can be useful for tracking both the peace and conflict context (e.g. for evidence of rising tensions) and risks of causing harm (e.g. tracking negative responses to an intervention amongst the local community).
- **Conflict sensitivity incident trackers** seek to capture incidents where programme activities have had a negative or positive effect on the conflict (e.g. through increasing tensions) and identify the steps taken to respond. This can be helpful to identify patterns of negative impacts which may suggest a need to adopt programme-wide mitigation measures or adaptations to programme design.
- **Conflict sensitivity markers or audits** track whether key processes for conflict sensitivity have been undertaken or are in place (e.g. through undertaking a conflict analysis, reviewing risks and opportunities, maintaining a conflict sensitivity interactions log, etc).

**Table 5: Examples of interactions, adjustments and monitoring approaches in a Conflict Sensitivity Matrix**

Interaction (risk or opportunity)	Possible mitigation/response	Approach to monitoring
<p><b>Reconstruction project:</b> The Municipal council in the area where the project is being implemented is dominated by one tribe. This has the potential to increase concern amongst other tribes/groups around the (in)equitable division of project benefits. This could lead to increased divisions and tensions between the council and communities and between the communities themselves – with potential for violent backlash. [risk type = distribution effect]</p>	<p>Include broad representation from different communities and groups (gender/ ethnicity/age/political affiliation) in determining reconstruction needs and in monitoring implementation, in consultation with the Municipal Council. Set up a consultative dialogue mechanism e.g. via local Social Peace Partnerships.</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> perceptions of fairness of local authority decision making; trust in local authorities.</p> <p><b>Data source:</b> public opinion survey.</p> <p><b>Frequency of collection:</b> quarterly.</p>

### Box 8: Top tips for monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity

- **Integrate conflict sensitivity monitoring within existing monitoring mechanisms and tools** where possible, including risk matrices, results frameworks and reporting. This is preferable to creating new systems and documentation, as conflict sensitivity may then be sidelined when resource pressure is high.
- **Collect data in a conflict-sensitive manner.** M&E is typically challenging in conflict-affected areas, where access may be limited, restrictions are in place and tensions are high. It is therefore important to consider the potential conflict sensitivity impacts of the data collection processes themselves. For example, how interviewees may relate to the conflict considering gender- or ethnicity-related dynamics, as this may contribute to tensions or impact responses. Targeting considerations are also important: men/women, old/young, migrant/non-migrant and people of different tribal affiliations will bring different perspectives. Timing is also important as it may impact on the types of respondents available (e.g. the time of data collection may exclude certain groups).
- **Ensure indicators are realistic given the resources available and access to data.** There is no point in identifying indicators that cannot realistically be measured.
- **Make sure indicators and data are disaggregated** where possible according to relevant considerations within the context; for example, geographic areas, community group and gender, **and make sure they are qualitative as well as quantitative**, in order to obtain a richer picture.
- **Develop indicators in a participatory way and draw on available technical and local support.** What is meaningful and possible to measure when tracking conflict and conflict sensitivity will vary according to the local context and the data sources available. Developing good indicators requires experience and expertise. Developing indicators is therefore best done in a participatory way involving those with a solid understanding of the local context as well as those with M&E expertise.

### 2.3 Providing an enabling environment for conflict sensitivity

For conflict sensitivity to operate in practice, there needs to be a supportive organisational environment in terms of policies, processes and incentives. Organisations can foster conflict sensitivity within their organisations by taking the following steps:

**Embed conflict sensitivity into organisational values and practices.** This involves senior management prioritising and pushing for the Steps of conflict sensitivity to be built into policies and processes, including standard operating procedures, and staff to be given an understanding of, and accountability for, their own role and responsibility for delivering conflict sensitivity.

**Ensuring adequate resources are available for analysis.** Enough resources need to be made available, including time, staff and financial resources, to undertake conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity reviews. This requires that analysis processes be embedded into activity management plans, budgets and M&E plans, and factored into funding proposals.

**Encourage a culture of reflection and feedback loops.** Conflict sensitivity involves asking difficult questions around impacts and potential harms. To be effective, organisations need to encourage a culture of critical thinking and open communication across the organisation, in which staff feel confident to discuss challenges and problems openly, and identify solutions. Regular update, reflection and challenge sessions can be built into specific points in the delivery and governance of a programme; for example, at programme planning or review meetings. It is particularly important in the Libyan context to maintain open and regular communication between international staff and Libyan staff operating on the ground, as most organisations are implementing remotely. Libyan staff are the programme's eyes and ears and are vital to both identifying and responding to conflict sensitivity issues.

**Ensuring flexible and adaptable programmes.** Working in the volatile Libyan context requires organisations to rapidly adapt assistance to the changing context, and when new conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities are identified. This necessitates that internal policies and processes are flexible enough to allow for changes in workplans and budgets, and even priorities. Donors and partners should have open discussions about how to build mechanisms for flexible (and adaptive) programming into projects from the beginning.

**Building staff capacity.** All staff, even if not directly involved in delivering the programme, need to be aware of conflict sensitivity and how it relates to their work. This involves ensuring that staff have access to resources and training on conflict sensitivity. Some country programmes have introduced focal points or champions of conflict sensitivity that staff can turn to for advice, and many organisations have dedicated conflict and fragility units or expertise at headquarters. Conflict sensitivity and an introduction to the Libyan context should be a central part of the induction process for new staff. Peaceful Change initiative runs a series of trainings on conflict sensitivity, and a regular Conflict Sensitivity Forum which is an important source of insights and updates on the overall context in Libya.

**Integrate conflict sensitivity into donor and implementing partner relationships.** Where organisations work through local partners, they need to support their ability to operate with conflict sensitivity. Partners need to be assessed for their capability and capacity to implement programmes in a conflict-sensitive manner and be incentivised and supported to do so (see Box 9). Partners themselves should keep donors aware of the conflict sensitivity issues that are emerging in a programme, since donors may be able to support the response (for example, by allowing for more flexibility, or taking up issues within political advocacy). Fostering a culture of trust and open and transparent communication with Libyan partners is critical.

#### **Box 9: Incentivising partners to be conflict sensitive**

- Assess partners for their position within the conflict. Do their interests and positions represent a conflict sensitivity risk or can they provide a conflict sensitivity opportunity?
- Include a demonstration of conflict sensitivity as a key requirement within tender calls for proposals and include an assessment of conflict sensitivity as a criterion within the proposal evaluation/scoring framework (e.g. existence of analysis, adaptive programming etc).
- Encourage partners to have a budget line for conflict sensitivity and to include this in the work plan.
- Require partners to have appropriate mechanisms for conflict sensitivity monitoring.
- Include conflict sensitivity as a requirement within contracts.
- Encourage partners to report conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities as part of risk reporting.
- Include a section on conflict context and conflict sensitivity monitoring within reporting formats.
- Include conflict sensitivity as a key line of enquiry within reviews and evaluations of partner projects.
- Ensure that enough funding is available for the above requirements and support partner capacity building in relation to conflict sensitivity.

**Identify organisational strengths and weaknesses on conflict sensitivity** through undertaking an organisational conflict sensitivity self-assessment. A template for the self-assessment form is in Annex C.

**Create a conflict sensitivity action plan for programmes.** Whilst conflict sensitivity should be integrated within existing processes, it can be helpful to develop a conflict sensitivity action plan that brings together in one place all the information and activities that will ensure programmes operate with conflict sensitivity. Such an action plan should include:

- plans for commissioning and reviewing/refreshing existing local conflict analysis;
- a conflict sensitivity interaction, mitigation, management and monitoring matrix;
- a monitoring plan of identified risks and opportunities;
- a plan for identification and monitoring new, emerging and location-specific risks and opportunities;
- responsibility divisions and information flows for conflict sensitivity;
- priorities for staff/institutional capacity building (drawing on the findings of an organisational self-assessment form), including a conflict sensitivity workshop for local staff.

These actions should be realistic, building on existing capacities and resources for conflict sensitivity, or aiming to address capacity gaps where they exist.

## CSA resources

The CSA Forum continuously develops new tools and resources to support conflict sensitivity. The following resources are currently available:

### Peace and conflict analysis

Libya Peace and Conflict Analysis, June 2022

CSA Forum Online Conflict Analysis Libya. Available at <https://opseca.humanidev.tech/opseca>. Login details available on request from PCi

Sabha Peace and Conflict Analysis, January 2022

Tawergha Peace and Conflict Analysis, September 2021

Ajdabiya Peace and Conflict Analysis, December 2021

Sirte Peace and Conflict Analysis, June 2022

### Thematic conflict sensitivity resources

Conflict sensitivity risks, opportunities and trade-offs in Libya: A resource for assistance providers, June 2022. Available at <https://peacefulchange.org/resources/>

[Conflict sensitivity considerations relating to local governance assistance in Libya, September 2019](#)

[Conflict sensitivity considerations relating to the COVID-19 response in Libya, March 2020](#)

Conflict Sensitivity considerations relating to communications activities in Libya, June 2022. Available at <https://peacefulchange.org/resources/>

[Conflict sensitivity and gender dynamics in Libya, June 2022. Available at https://peacefulchange.org/resources/](#)

### Conflict sensitivity tools

Strengthening conflict sensitivity and effective communication with partners: A guide for Libyan field staff, June 2022. Available at <https://peacefulchange.org/resources/>

Conflict Sensitivity Organisational Self-Assessment Form

Template Conflict Sensitivity Matrix

Conflict Sensitivity Incident Tracker

Types of conflict sensitivity interaction

For queries on new resources or any other matters related to the CSA, please contact [Libyacsa@peacefulchange.org](mailto:Libyacsa@peacefulchange.org).

## Annex A Conflict sensitivity interactions matrix

**Purpose:** This tool supports identification of conflict sensitivity interactions along with mitigations, responses and adaptations aimed at managing the interaction's likelihood and/or impact, and potential ways of monitoring whether the interactions have occurred.

Conflict sensitivity interaction	Description	Possible mitigation, response and adaptation	Approach to monitoring

## Annex B Conflict sensitivity incident tracker

**Purpose:** This tool supports systematic and regular monitoring (tracking and logging) of potential conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities, including responses to managing them. The tool consists of two matrices: 1) A tracker which outlines the process, approaches and means of monitoring each interaction; and 2) A tracker which logs incidents that occur and captures approaches to managing them.

### Conflict sensitivity tracker process

Conflict sensitivity interaction	Unit of Measurement, Calculation Method	Method of Collection	Frequency	Responsibility & other comments

### Conflict sensitivity incident tracker

Date	Description	Type of risk	Data source	Location	Mitigation/response/adaptation

## Annex C Conflict sensitivity organisational self-assessment form

**Purpose:** This tool supports identification of key factors within an organisation and programme that may be supporting or constraining conflict sensitivity. It helps to identify where capacity strengthening accompaniment on conflict sensitivity may be most relevant and useful.

QUESTION	Scale 1 – 5 (1 is not at all)	Comment or Action
<b>Management commitment, leadership and organisational values</b>		
Are programme management or senior leadership (i.e. programme managers and more senior staff) aware of, and can they describe the concept and application of conflict sensitivity?		
Does management actively promote and encourage conflict sensitivity? (e.g. through the allocation of time for analysis and reflection; budgetary resources for conflict analysis; knowledge and skill development of staff?)		
Are staff and partners encouraged to and do they feel comfortable to report observed negative impacts of programmes and activities?		
<b>Policies, operational processes and guidance</b>		
Is there an organisational policy or guidance on conflict sensitivity?		
Are actions supportive of conflict sensitivity embedded within operating policies, programme management guidelines, documentation, templates and procedures etc.		
Do policies and processes allow for enough flexibility to adapt programmes and activities as the context shifts or conflict sensitivity risks/ opportunities emerge?		
<b>Staff and human resources</b>		
Can all staff involved in the programme give a good, basic description of conflict sensitivity? (including beyond the programme team – i.e. drivers, admin and finance etc.)		
Do staff (and partners) understand why conflict sensitivity is relevant to their role and what the expectations are?		

QUESTION	Scale 1 – 5 (1 is not at all)	Comment or Action
Is the responsibility to act with conflict sensitivity stated in job descriptions of staff, in memoranda of understanding with partners?		
If needed, are staff (or partners) receiving support (training, mentoring, guidance) to develop the required skills?		
Is conflict sensitivity a consideration in the employment of staff?		
<b>Partnership and collaboration</b>		
Does conflict-sensitivity play a role in your choice of local partners?		
Do you habitually compare notes on your assessment of context and the consequences of interventions, with other agencies operating in the same area?		
Is conflict sensitivity integrated into Calls for Proposals and their approval process?		
Do donor actions or requirements constrain the ability of the programme to be conflict sensitive? (e.g. in relation to inflexible procedures, pressure to spend etc.)		
<b>Integration into the programme cycle.</b>		
Are interventions/ programmes informed by a conflict analysis?		
Have you identified and recorded conflict sensitivity risks, opportunities and dilemmas relating to the programme/ intervention and approaches to mitigating/ managing these?		
Do formal and informal monitoring and reporting systems (including reporting from partners) ensure that conflict sensitivity issues are discussed and kept under review?		
Is conflict sensitivity a formal element of discussions within programme governance arrangements? (steering committees, boards etc.)		

**This resource was prepared through the Conflict Sensitive Assistance in Libya Forum.**

The Conflict Sensitive Assistance in Libya (CSA) Forum, funded by the Government of Switzerland and the European Union and facilitated by the Peaceful Change initiative, aims to support the ability of international assistance providers working in and on Libya to undertake their work in a conflict-sensitive manner – minimising the risk of harm caused by their assistance and maximising opportunities to promote positive peace.

The CSA forum has been run since 2013 and includes: regular forum meetings bringing together international organisations, donors and implementers to consider how the changing context in Libya affects and is affected by their programming; research and preparation of resource materials relating to conflict sensitivity in Libya; and technical support to implementers, through convening discussions, provision of training, and tailored advice relating to conflict sensitivity.