

# Conflict-Sensitive Assistance in Libya

Summary of discussion 16 February 2017

Acropole Hotel, Tunis

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra



The Conflict-Sensitive Assistance in Libya (CSA) forum, co-hosted by UNDP Libya and the Swiss Embassy to Libya and facilitated by the Peaceful Change Initiative (PCi), met for its 19<sup>th</sup> meeting on 16<sup>th</sup> February 2017 at the Acropole Hotel in Tunis. The meeting, held under Chatham House Rules, was attended by 38 persons from 25 different organisations.

The meeting included:

- An overview of the CSA process and its various components;
- Update of the shared conflict analysis, reflection on the interaction between the context and international programming; and generating recommendations on how to respond to the changes in the context in order to make programming more conflict-sensitive;
- A review of the conflict analysis framework to be used in future CSA meetings.

## Overview of the CSA process

A short presentation (attached) provided basic information on the concept of Conflict-Sensitive Assistance as well as the background to the CSA process.

## Joint Analysis and Reflection

The participants reviewed and updated the 28 [Key Factors](#) that constitute the framework for the joint context analysis sessions. The following analysis and recommendations (highlighted in bold) emerged from the discussions:

Area	Factor	Assessment	Impact & Recommendation
Economic	<a href="#">Currency Crisis</a>	Neither improving nor worsening	The difference in valuation of the Libyan Dinar between the official exchange rate and the black market rate continues to raise operational issues for assistance providers in Libya. In particular it raises the challenge of compliance (with the official rate) versus efficiency (better value for the dollar on the black market rates).  ➤ <b>Assistance providers, and the international community, should clarify the operational approach and best-practice for cash management within Libya to ensure that cash transfers respond to the valuation issue in a conflict sensitive manner.</b>
Economic	<a href="#">Smuggling and Illicit Trade</a>	Neither improving nor worsening	The push against fuel smuggling, if it continues, is likely to undermine the interests of several significant communities and armed actors in the West of the country. The responses of such actors could be destabilising, particularly if they use violence to defend their interests or to take control of key infrastructure as a bargaining tool.  ➤ <b>International assistance providers should explore options for quick impact efforts to address some of the structural issues contributing to fuel smuggling, such as lack of economic diversity and opportunity, and unemployment, in those areas where the GNA may undertake enforcement efforts against smuggling actors.</b>
Economic	<a href="#">Public Finances</a>	Improving	➤ <b>Within the public finances factor, the CSA conflict analysis tends to focus on the situation in the West; future updates should include better analysis of the situation in the East as</b>

Facilitated by



			<b>well.</b>
Political	<a href="#">Local Governance and De-centralisation</a>	Neither improving nor worsening	<p>Continued military appointments of mayors in the East affect the way international actors are able to engage in the country. Different responses by international actors towards engaging with non-democratically appointed local governors may undermine efforts to signal that moves towards undermining democratic processes are unacceptable.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>The international community should clarify and demonstrate a consistent position regarding the appointment of local governors over democratically appointed mayors.</b></li> <li>➤ <b>Assistance providers should look at ways to address some of the acute humanitarian and basic services needs in the South of the country, in order to help counter the strengthening of political divisions.</b></li> </ul>
Political	<a href="#">Political Process and Unity Government</a>	Worsening	<p>It remains to be seen whether moves by militias associated with Khalifa Ghwell will have a significant impact on the broader political process and the ability of the GNA to function.</p> <p>The strong level of international support for the GNA is a regular complaint of its critics, which have attempted to portray the PC and the GNA as a vehicle for foreign interests. This is particularly the case in the East, where actors portray the international community as neglecting their needs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>While continuing to stress the political process, international assistance providers should work to counter impressions that they are largely focused on supporting Western Libyan political actors, perhaps by working on ways to provide assistance more transparently in other parts of the country.</b></li> </ul>
Security	<a href="#">Militias and Armed Groups</a>	Worsening	<p>The actions of militias and armed groups continue to destabilize the country across all regions, with significant violent clashes between several groups in and around Tripoli, Benghazi, Jufra and Sabha reported. These clashes, and the presence of these factions, continue to undermine the international community's ability to deliver assistance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>Assistance providers working on the security sector should conduct a 'centre of gravity' analysis to look at the political affiliations of militias and armed groups. This could perhaps be part of a stakeholder analysis for the CSA process.</b></li> </ul>
Social	<a href="#">Role of Media</a>	Neither improving nor worsening	<p>Some actors within Libya's partisan media space, both social media and broadcast media, have worked to undermine the reputation of international assistance providers, affecting access and impact.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>Assistance providers working on strategic communications should look at more effective engagement in Libya's social media space, perhaps including social media literacy training for key partners and mechanisms for empowering more neutral and pro-peace social media voices.</b></li> </ul>

Social	<a href="#">Weak Civil Society</a>	Neither improving nor worsening	In the west of the country, military activity in and around Tripoli has been an impediment to the work of civil society organisations. The situation regarding humanitarian and civil society space in Benghazi, and in the East more broadly, remains quite closed and the space for collaboration with local partners is reported to be shrinking.
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Participants in the CSA can contribute to the ongoing analysis by leaving comments on the online platform. Please add your observations and analysis on developments under Snapshot 7 on the OPSECA platform. These will be taken into account in the preparation for joint analysis for the next meeting of the CSA, planned for 20<sup>th</sup> April 2017.

### Updating the Conflict Analysis Framework

Participants reviewed the Key Factors used for the last 12 months of the CSA process and proposed adjustments to make the analysis framework more appropriate to their work and the changing context for the coming 12 months. Proposed changes will be reviewed by the hosts and facilitators of the process and proposed adjustments to the analytical framework will be made before the next meeting.

A complete overview of the updated analysis can be found by logging into the OPSECA online platform at: <https://opseca.humanidev.tech>

For a profile to make use of the platform, please contact [csalibya@peacefulchange.org](mailto:csalibya@peacefulchange.org). Only organisations participating in the forum have access to the online platform (one login profile per organisation).